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Abstract
The succession of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has attracted growing attention
from social scientists and management researchers. CEO succession provides a context
in which individual decisions and agency, stakeholder interests and conflict, and the
organizational needs for legitimacy and acceptance in the large environment come
together. Most of these researches, however, have been conducted in the U.S., where the
board of directors has the legal and actual responsibility for appointing and replacing
the CEO. CEO succession still remains unexplored terrain in countries such as Japan in
which the corporation system differs significantly from the U.S. For example, the board
of directors in Japan is composed primarily of executives and non-executive members of
the firm and overwhelmingly represents the interests of the employees. Also, a
Japanese CEO enjoys considerable autonomy from stakeholder influence, where he is
usually the sole authority in deciding the timing of his own retirement as well as his
successor. Although main banks provide a limit to CEO power, they tend to refrain
from intervening in CEO succession until the firm is in a dire condition.
In this thesis, I apply the model of CEO succession based on U.S. firms to the study of
Japanese CEO succession. I address three questions: 1) what are the rules in the shacho
(Japanese equivalent of CEO) succession process; 2) how are the rules framed and what
does this linguistic framing suggest about shacho succession in Japan; and 3) how do the
rules affect the various succession processes, such as the timing of change as well as the
relationship between performance and rules. The theoretical framework I use is based
on the institutional theory of action by March (1994) and March & Olsen (1989), and I
-rely on both qualitative and quantitative methods to answer the research questions..
I-use a qualitative study to identify succession rules in large Japanese firms. Through
CEO succession stories from popular business journals, I identify the two guiding
spirits of CEO succession in Japan: the spirit of rejuvenation, in which the CEO
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succession's main function is to bring younger executives to the leadership position,
and the principle of hanamichi (translated as 'flower way'), in which the CEO succession
celebrates good performance by the exiting leader. In addition, tenure rules, such as
four-year rules, six-year rules, and sometimes ten-year rules, are widely used for
guiding the CEO succession process in Japan.
I then turn to a large sample longitudinal study to test the implication of one of the
succession rules -the tenure rules - identified in the qualitative analysis. I capture the
various tenure rules by suggesting the concept of tenure milestone set by the
predecessor's tenure. A CEO's life cycle can be divided into three distinctive periods
based on tenure milestone-before the milestone, milestone, and over-the milestone-
presenting different mandates for the incumbent CEO. Specifically, I hypothesize that
(1) CEO succession is more likely during the tenure milestone period, (2) the effect of
performance is different across the three periods, and (3) organizational and political
factors moderate the tenure milestone effect on CEO change. I test the hypotheses in a
sample of the 200 largest industrial companies in Japan over the period 1955-1995 using
event history analysis. The empirical results show that the hazard rate is higher during
the tenure milestone period and that the negative effect of performance is stronger in
the over-the-milestone period than in the other two periods. Finally, organizational and
political factors, such as the existence of a large internal talent pool and subunit rivalry
resulting from merger, also facilitate CEO change during the tenure milestone period.
The thesis shows that organizational rules are an important addition in understanding
the phenomenon of CEO succession.
Thesis Committee: D. Eleanor Westney, Thesis Chair
Society of Sloan Fellows Professor of Management, MIT
Lotte Bailyn
T. Wilson Professor of Management, MIT
William Ocasio
Associate Professor of Management, Northwestern University
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Chapter 1. CEO succession as a focus of research
The succession of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is a potentially traumatic event for the
retiring CEO. Sonnenfeld (1988) has discussed in detail how the heroic self-image of leaders
makes it difficult for them to exit. "Heroes believe that they have earned their stature through
their deeds and sacrifice. Thus they do not realize until their retirement that their position is, in
part, a social creation. The hero's personal identity is so intertwined with his or her role that
retirement represents a personal void" (Sonnenfeld, 1988, p.284). Sonnenfeld provides several
examples where political heroes -for example, Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt-refused to retire, some of them even reneging on their prior
commitment to retire upon reaching a certain time or age.
Business leaders, especially CEOs, face a similar set of challenges as they approach retirement.
Like political leaders, they face the loss of power and status. They also often face higher
economic costs. So, it is not difficult to imagine why many top executives cling to their position,
some even to death. Such reluctance is quite common and examples are abundant (Sonnenfeld,
1988; Kets de Vries, 1995).
There are two major ways the problem of reluctant heroes is addressed: the power dynamics
among actors, and the establishment of formal rules. In the past, political leaders who tried to
hold on to power too long were in danger of invasion from powerful foreign enemies. The
analogy for CEOs is the hostile takeover. Second, both political and business leaders face
threats to their power from below, as impatient followers form coalitions to replace ailing
leaders. Third, powerful forces outside the political elite, such as People Power in the
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Philippines, or outside the management system, such as external shareholders, can take action
to force out a leader who stays too long.
Such political action takes a toll on the system. Therefore, in order to avoid such struggles, both
political systems and corporations develop formal rules to guide succession processes. Societies
and organizations also make formal rules that limit the term or tenure of the top leaders. For
example, the office of President in the U.S. is limited to 4 years, after which the President may
campaign for reelection for a maximum of one term. Most political offices are subject to such
specific rules, where the terms and the qualification for being in the office are specified.
Similarly, firms may have a retirement age for their top executives. Through these formalized
bureaucratic rules, the succession process is routinized and the leadership is institutionalized
(Weber, 1978).
Although rules tend to be taken for granted when they have been established, how rules
emerge in the first place is never simple or easy. Multiple actors with different interests engage
in bitter political struggles in order to set up rules that are beneficial to themselves. Even when
rules are taken for granted, the dissatisfied party may engage in various political behaviors to
change the rules of the game. The rule process is dynamic and political. Framing the issues in a
way that would legitimize the change of rules is quite important in the batfle (Hirsch, 1986).
CEO succession has some of the drama and many of the challenges of changes in political
leadership, and has attracted growing attention from social scientists and management
researchers. Most of this research has been conducted in the U.S., where the board of directors
has the legal and actual responsibility for appointing and replacing the CEO. The board of
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directors represents the shareholders of the corporation, in whose interests they are required to
act. The American model of corporate governance has been held up as a model to other
business systems around the world.
In the 1980s, Japanese corporations presented an alternative model of corporate governance in
which the board of directors is composed primarily of executives and non-executive members
of the firm and overwhelmingly represents the interests of the employees (Abegglen and Stalk,
1985; Aoki, 1988; Lazonick 1991). Given this difference in corporate governance, we would
expect to see a great difference in the process of CEO succession. However, although Japanese
corporate governance has been criticized, especially recently (see for example Nakatani, 1997;
Tezuka, 1997), there have been very few empirical studies that looked at the actual process of
CEO succession in Japan. What we do know is that there are very few public contests or
struggles over CEO succession in Japan. And yet in most Japanese companies, CEOs do not
have unusually long tenure. Indeed, the tenure of the shacho (which is the Japanese term most
usually used to translate CEO, and which means, literally, "the leader of the company") in large
industrial firms has become shorter and shorter over the last few decades (Itami, 1995). This
shortening of shacho tenure in the absence of a strong and independent board and without
strong external stakeholder influence suggests that organizational rules may play a bigger role
in limiting the power and tenure of the shacho in Japan. I argue that the study of succession
rules is the first step in understanding the succession process in Japanese firms, and in this
dissertation I carry out such a study of succession rules in Japanese large industrial firms.
Why is the operation of succession rules an important venue for research? The rise of the new
institutionalism in the study of organizations focused attention on the constraints on individual
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and collective action imposed by socially constructed rules and the taken-for-granted nature of
routines (see the papers collected in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This perspective has been
criticized for neglecting the role of individual agency (DiMaggio, 1988) and more importantly
the role of power and conflict in organizations (Oliver, 1991). CEO succession provides a
context in which individual decisions and agency, stakeholder interests and conflict, and the
organizational needs for legitimacy and acceptance in the large environment come together.
This research context provides us with an opportunity to deepen our understanding of the
complex interplay between agency and power on the one hand and social constraint and
legitimacy on the other.
This study follows Ocasio (1999)'s lead in analyzing the CEO succession process and the
corporate governance issue from the perspective of rules and in applying an institutional
perspective at the level of 'action'. Applying the institutional theory of action enunciated by
March and Olsen (1989) and March (1994) to the study of CEO succession, Ocasio (1999) argues
that rules provide actors with the scripts for action, function as a political truce among multiple
actors, and thus provide reliability and accountability in the system. While Ocasio (1999)
examined the role of formal and informal rules on the issue of insider vs. outsider succession, I
examine the role of tenure rules in the timing of Japanese CEO succession. Moreover, I further
elaborate the key proposition of institutionalized action theory -that the rules are attached to
identity. The actors analyze the situation and match the rules with identity and situation. By
bringing the level of analysis to that of organizational action, we can observe the interplay
between power and agency on the one hand and institutional pressure on the other hand.
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Specifically, the thesis asks: 1) what are the succession rules in the shacho succession process; 2)
how are the rules framed and what does this linguistic framing suggest about shacho succession
in Japan; and 3) how do the rules affect the various succession precesses, such as the timing of
change as well as the relationship between performance and rules.
In order to answer these questions, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative
and quantitative methods complement each other as they provide insights into different aspects
of organizational rule processes. In order to answer the first two questions, I undertake a
qualitative study in which popular business articles provide the material for developing
insights into succession processes, and into what is considered "normal" and what is
considered "unusual" or "rule-breaking" in CEO succession. There are several reasons why a
qualitative study is more appropriate in answering the two questions. First, organizational rules
often vary significantly across firms and may be hard to quantify for a large sample study. For
example, some firms may have a 4 year tenure rule, while some may have 6 or even 10. Second,
the rule process is dynamic, where rules are frequently broken and reestablished. Thus, some
organizational rules are not so evident to outside observers. For example, some firms may have
a rule for the shacho to retire as a chairman, yet some may choose not to become chairman upon
retirement for a variety of reasons. The absence of a rule is quite different from a rule that is
broken. A quantitative study is not appropriate for capturing such dynamics. Finally, the
change in the rules of the game often accompanies an ideological battle, which is captured only
through qualitative study. Linguistic framing affects organizational behavior by providing a
script for the participants (Hirsch, 1986). It specifies not only the role for individual actors but
also how they should feel about the course of action. The qualitative chapter could be thought
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of as developing a grounded theory in which the main purpose is to develop the hypotheses
rather than to test the hypotheses.
As for the third question, quantitative methods are more appropriate. For one thing, some
organizational rules could be institutionalized across organizational fields. Quantitative,
analysis may be better suited to trace the diffusion process as well as to test larger social,
organizational, and political factors that affect the establishment of institutionalized rules.
Moreover, there are rules that exist only as rhetoric. A quantitative study also will distinguish
the rules that have lesser social impact from those that have stronger impact on the actual
behavior of participants. In other words, we would like to know when and how rules affect
actual economic and political behavior, in this case, CEO succession.
Getting tothe research questions
The biggest challenge in writing a dissertation is not answering the questions, but formulating
questions that are both interesting and answerable. In fact, alternative questions were
considered in the course of this research, and it may be worth describing the process by which
the final questions were arrived at.
The choice of Japanese CEO succession as a topic of research grew7out of work with Professor
William Ocasio on CEO succession in the U.S. Initially, the work consisted of studying the
change in the functional backgrounds of CEOs (Ocasio & Kim, 1999) and the role of institutional
shareholding on CEO succession (Kim & Ocasio, 1995). Next through discussions with
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Professor Eleanor Westney, it became clear that the process of CEO succession in Japan was
quite different from the U.S. and appeared to be a fruitful domain of research.
The first approach I adopted was grounded on the widely recognized differences between the
corporate governance systems in Japan and the U.S. and the strong influence in Japan of the
view of the enterprise as a community whose principal stakeholders are the employees rather
than the shareholders (Dore, 1973 and 1987; Imai and Komiya, 1994; Whitley, 1992). The first
questions generated from this approach were 1) Is the relationship between performance and
CEO succession different in Japan vs. the U.S.? 2) How do the differences in corporate
governance systems moderate the relationship between performance and CEO succession? 3)
What was the role of three external shocks - oil shocks, the rise of the yen, and the end of the
bubble economy -in shaping the CEO succession process? The initial exploration of these
questions indicated that they were not the right ones to be asking but they did lead to an
understanding of what kind of data I needed to collect.
In building a data base on CEO succession in Japan, I quickly discovered that Japanese CEO
succession had something quite unique: a routinized pattern of CEO succession, which had
been explored quite extensively, although descriptively, by Itami (1995). What was interesting
from Itami's study was his conclusion that routinization is a cause for concern, because it
symbolizes the lack of charismatic leaders in Japanese business firms. This was curious,
because, from a U.S. point of view, the major problem in CEO succession was managerial
entrenchment. Japanese firms, however, have apparently overcome this problem, without the
independent boards and active takeover markets that were the primary means of controlling
managerial entrenchment in the U.S. There were many other reasons beside the routinization of
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CEO succession that made Itami worry about Japanese firms - such as the increasing age of top
executives in general at the time of their appointment and the inflexibility in the preferred age
of the CEO and so on -and someone who had not studied CEO succession in the U.S. could
easily agree with his diagnosis that at least one cause of these problems was the routinization of
CEO succession But the difference between the Japanese and U.S. patterns naturally led to the
next focus of research, "Is routinization actually bad, and what conditions lead to it?"
Initially, I undertook categorical approach. Routinization of CEO change was loosely defined as
having implicit or explicit rules about the tenure of a CEO within the company. Criteria were
needed to decide which firms had "routinized" CEO tenure. Two criteria were developed: the
number of CEO change events in a given period, and the central tendency of CEOs' length of
tenure in the given period. First, there should be more than 3 CEO change events in each
period. Second, the lengths of tenure should fall between the 25th and 75th percentile of all
tenure lengths in the periods of interest. I evaluated these criteria for 200 firms in two time
periods, 1955 to 1975 and 1975 to 1995. Using the two criteria, 17 firms in the early period and
73 firms in the following period were categorized as having routinized the CEO change pattern.
Given that not all firms had the routinized CEO change pattern, I furthered asked what were
the characteristics of firms that showed routinization. The difference between Itami's findings
and mine provided one explanation, having to do with the sample size and the distribution of
size~ of firms. The Itami study looked at 50 mostly large firms, whereas my study looked at 200
firms, including many that were smaller. If the routinization criteria were applied only to the
larger firms, Itami's conclusions appeared to be confirmed. This exposure to the data led to the
hypotheses that routinization was related to having no dominant owner, the existence of a
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competitive internal labor market (as indicated by the number of elite university graduates in
the board), prior merger experience, and affiliation with the leading keiretsu (industry groups in
Japan).
Although the initial analysis was quite useful in giving some idea why routinization happened
in large Japanese firms, it had many problems. First, the operationalization of routinization was
arbitrary. Second, the operationalization of routinization did not allow any observation of the
dynamics of the routinization process. Third, the concept did not have any clear link with
theory. A new idea was needed.
The new idea came from my advisers who encouraged thinking about the phenomenon in
terms of 'rules' rather than in terms of 'routinization'. Actually, it was obvious that the
routinization was a result of having multiple rules regarding the timing of CEO's exit, such as
retirement age rules and tenure limit rules. However, it seemed that there are too many
varieties in 'rules' across firms -there were 4 year rules, 6 year rules and 10 year rules - and it
was not clear how to incorporate the diversity in the large sample quantitative study.
This impasse was broken when, under firm guidance by advisers, the level of analysis was
changed from firms to succession events. This led to the concept of the tenure milestone, in
which a predecessor's tenure works as an informal tenure rule. Through the concept of the
tenure milestone, it was possible not only to deal with the diversity in tenure rules but also to
elaborate on how tenure rules may shape the actors' expectations in the course of CEO
succession.
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Changing the focus from routinization to rules also expanded the scope of the study
significantly. First, it became possible to link the study to the rich theoretical traditions that
emphasized the role of rules in organizational life (Bums and Flam, 1987; March and Olsen,
1989; March 1994; and Ocasio, 1999). On trying to apply these rule theories to Japanese CEO
succession, it became clear that there are other important rules, other than tenure rules, that
make Japanese CEO succession different from the U.S. For example, rules specify who
participates (and who is excluded), who does what, when, where, and how, and in relationship
to whom (Burns & Flam, 1987), and it became clear that implicit norms of the Japanese
succession process, such as a CEO taking charge of his own retirement, or a CEO retiring as a
chairman were important rules even though organizational actors themselves do not refer to
them as 'rules'. Thus, the question 'what are the implicit and explicit rules of Japanese CEO
succession?' became an important first step that needed to be addressed through qualitative
analysis of CEO succession stories published in popular business magazines. The importance of
linguistic framing also became evident while accumulating the collection of stories of Japanese
CEO succession.
Outline of Chapters
Chapter 2 suggests a model of CEO succession based on the institutional theory of action
developed principally by James March (March and Olsen, 1989; Match 1994). The institutional
theory of action provide; the concept of organizational identity and rules to link the political
process and the institutional logic that shape the CEO succession process and outcome. I also
review some of the prior studies on CEO succession and organizational rules to illustrate the
relationships among institutional logic, power dynamics among stakeholders, and
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organizational identity and rules. As indicated in my discussion of the process of formulating
my research questions, the institutionalized action theory is not the theory that guided my
study from the beginning. Rather, it is a theory that I 'discovered' in the later stage of my
dissertation. Nevertheless, I present it as a theory in this chapter, because I believe it provides
the best introduction, as well as the best summary, for the subject of CEO succession both in the
U.S. and in Japan.
Chapter 3 reviews the corporate governance system in Japan by exploring the nature of the
boards of directors, dominant institutional logic, and four types of dominant stakeholders that
shape organizational identity and succession rules in Japanese firms.
Chapter 4 takes on a qualitative study to identify succession rules in large Japanese firms. The
chapter identifies'succession rules by adopting the journalist's lens on what it takes to make
CEO succession processes usual or unusual in the Japanese business world.
Chapter 5 applies a large sample longitudinal study to test the implication of one set of the
succession rulhs -the tenure rules -identified in Chapter 4. The chapter takes the predecessor's
tenure as an informal and formal rule that regulates the timing of CEO change in Japanese
firms. It tests how tenure rules moderate the relationship between performance and the timing
of CEO succession.
Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion on the role of organizational rules on CEO succession. In
that section, I also identify further research questions.
19
This page intentionally left blank
20
Chapter 2. Power dynamics among stakeholders, institutional logic, and CEO succession
rules
The phenomenon of CEO succession has been the focus of a significant body of research,
particularly in the United States. The dominant approach has been to see CEO succession as a
political process in which various stakeholders contend for influence in the process (March,
1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The succession process both reflects and shapes CEO and
stakeholder power. These studies focused on identifying conditions that will increase the
power of the CEO and the characteristics of stakeholders that would limit the power of the
CEO. An alternative perspective draws on institutional theory, and explores the role of the
institutional logic of society and of organizational fields in shaping CEO succession process
and outcomes (Fligstein, 1990; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Despite the large and growing volume of succession studies, the literature on CEO succession
remains somewhat unsatisfactory, and the two theoretical frameworks are not effectively
integrated. Most CEO succession studies based on power theory give little attention to the
larger institutional context; on the other hand, the specific processes through which
institutional logic shapes CEO succession are not fully understood. Oliver (1991)'s challenge to
link institutional theory and the power perspective is a significant one for CEO succession
studies.
The institutionalized action perspective (March & Olsen, 1989; March, 1994; Oc asio, 1999)
explicitly recognizes the role of political process in shaping rules and thus attempts to integrate
political perspective and institutional theory on organizational decision making. As Ocasio
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(1999) puts it, "reliance on rules does not imply a lack of political action and behavior; instead,
rules establish the parameters by which the political game is played. ... What distinguishes an
institutional theory of action from interest-based approaches is that according to this view,
while rules shape and are shaped by political processes, they are not merely the reflection of
the interests of decision makers but are shaped by history and experience and are not easily
changed in response to the immediate interests of organizational decision makers (p. 386)."
This chapter presents a brief overview of the political perspective in CEO succession in the U.S.
and then provides the alternative institutional perspective. Next, I develop a general model of
organizational process and outcome following the institutional theory of action enunciated by
James March (March, 1994; March & Olsen, 1989). Following March (1994) and Ocasio (1999), 1
propose that the way these two constructs - institutions and power - affect organizational
process and outcomes could be understood more cogently if we take the concept of
organizational identities and rules more seriously. Next, I apply the general model of
institutional theory of action to CEO succession and review the prior studies on CEO
succession and on organizational rules in light of the model. Finally, I consider some
methodological considerations in the study of CEO succession rules.
Political perspective in CEO succession literature
The office of CEO is unique in being the top position in the organizational hierarchy, as well as
the hub linking various stakeholders. CEOs may use their strategic position to extend their stay
amidst poor performance and may uncouple the usual link between poor performance and
their exit. Although many studies have found that poor performance is generally related to
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CEO succession (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991), other studies also found that the relationship was
rather weak (Weisbach, 1988; Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988), and in some cases
CEO succession was actually preceded by abnormally good performance, not bad performance
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989).
The literature on CEO succession could be characterized as identifying the factors and
conditions that uncouple the expected link between performance and the succession process
and outcome. Many analyses focused on the problem of CEOs' staying on even though their
company was performing poorly, and attributed this to the power of the CEO. Researchers
differ in their analysis of political processes that limit the power of the CEO. While resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983)1
emphasize the role of external stakeholders and the power contests among them as important
in bringing checks and balances to the executive power, strategic contingency theory (Hickson
et al., 1971; Fligstein, 1985, 1990), the theory of the circulation of power (Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio &
Kim, 1999), the theory of the institutionalization of power (Boeker, 1992), and socio political
theory (Frederickson et al, 1988) all emphasize the internal political dynamics that shape the
CEO succession process and outcome.
The two outcomes that have been studied most in the external view of CEO succession are the
timing of change (or tenure) and the choice of successor (for example, between an insider and
an outsider). The board is emphasized as the place where the interests of shareholders and
1 Resource dependence theory argues that firms rely or, external stakeholders for critical resources. The
external stakeholders can control the firm to the degree that the firm is dependent on the resources
supplied by the stakeholders. Agency theory could be thought of as a variant of resource dependence
theory, in which the power and the stake of shareholders has been particularly highlighted. In fact, the
two theories have a lot in common and make similar predictions regarding CEO succession.
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other stakeholders are contested and adjusted. It was hypothesized that poor performance will
hasten the timing of CEO change, and thus reduce the CEO tenure. It was also hypothesized
that the board is likely to prefer an outsider as a new CEO under conditions of poor
performance, since outsiders are more likely to bring changes in firm strategy and structure.
The power and stake of the shareholders and other stakeholders, such as the degree of
concentration of ownership, and the nature and characteristics of the board, such as the
proportion of outsiders and the separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO, have been
suggested as moderating the relationship between poor performance and CEO succession. As
predicted, poor performance was more likely to result in CEO succession and to result in the
selection of an outsider as the new CEO, when ownership was concentrated in the hands of
outsiders (Allen and Panian, 1981), when the board had a larger proportion of outside directors
(Weisbach, 1988; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993), and when the positions of chairman and CEO
were held by separate persons (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).
Theories that emphasized internal coalitions within the firm were interested in different
outcomes and processes of CEO succession, such as the functional background of the CEO, in
addition to the timing of the change and outsider succession, because these outcomes revealed
the various power bases of the CEO. Organizational actors rise to the top position by claiming
superior ability to shape the strategy and structure (Fligstein, 1985). The power of the CEO is
contingent upon the fit between the strategy and structure that he or she has created and the
external environment. The functional subunit is also considered an important source of the
CEO's power base.
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The institutionalization of power highlights the ability of CEOs to entrench themselves in
formal positions of authority (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977; Pfeffer 1981; Boeker, 1989). For example,
a CEO's power increases with tenure and he may become more difficult to get rid of over time.
Also, power could be institutionalized in a functional unit, which affects the choice of successor
(Boeker, 1989). The circulation of power, however, highlights the conditions that increase the
political contests within the firm. For example, a larger number of insiders in the board was
more likely to result in CEO succession under conditions of poor performance (Ocasio, 1994).
Also, CEOs with financial backgrounds, who gained prominence during the 1960s and 1970s
(Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Fligstein, 1987), were less likely to be succeeded by CEOs from the
same background in the 1980s and early 1990s, as the financial conception of control was
challenged by increased foreign competition and was criticized by management intellectuals
for its short-term orientation (Ocasio & Kim, 1999). The socio-political model of CEO succession
also emphasized the role of board expectations and allegiances in the dynamics of the CEO
succession process.
It should be noted, however, that political theories about internal dynamics have not been clear
about the locus of political struggle. The problem of successor choice centered on the political
contest among the candidates. It was assumed that a CEO's natural choice for a successor was
an insider from a similar functional background. But, it is not clear how these internal political
dynamics could challenge the CEO who has the formal authority.
Institutional theory and the challenge of integrating political perspective
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Institutional approaches suggest a different focus for studies of leadership power in
organizations -that interests, power, and politics in organizations are shaped by institutional
logics prevailing in wider environments (Fligstein, 1990; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Powell
1991; Davis and Greve, 1997; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). Institutional logic, which could be
defined as the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values,
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence,
provide meaning to their social reality and shape the sources of power, its meaning, and its
consequences (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).
Compared to the political process, the role of the institutional environment in shaping the
process and the outcome of CEO succession has been relatively unexplored. Some exceptions
are Fligstein (1985, 1990) and Thornton and Ocasio (1999), which I will review in a later section.
The lack of studies that examine the influence of institutional logic on CEO succession is related
to the fact that institutional logic and rules tend to stay in the background, as they are taken for
granted by organizational actors as well as by academics. There are two situations where the
study of institutional logic becomes important: when there is a change in the dominant
institutional logic over time, and when we attempt to apply theories developed in one national
context to another. In the current study, the need to take institutional logic into account was
generated at least in part when I tried to apply the theories and findings from the U.S. CEO
succession studies to the succession processes of Japanese CEOs. Through the process,
however, I also found out that the shift in institutional logic that has been documented by other
scholars has also changed the rules of CEO succession in the U.S. aver time.
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In applying institutional theory to the study of CEO succession, we need to incorporate the
political perspective that has been adopted by most CEO succession studies in the U.S. One of
the main criticisms of institutional theory is its neglect of the power and agency of the
organizational actors in shaping institutional logic (Oliver, 1991).
Institutionalized action theory integrates the power and agency of organizational actors and
the institutional context by examining institutional effect at the level of 'action' as opposed to
describing the institutional logic at the higher level. By focusing on 'action,' we are able to
observe the diversity in individual and organizational actions, which reflects the power and
agency of the actors. In addition, the concept of organizational identity, to which organizational
rules are closely matched, provides a useful way to integrate power and agency.
Organizational identity is both shaped by the organizational actors and is imposed upon them.
CEO succession is an example of such action where individual level and organizational level
identity formation becomes an important factor in guiding the succession process and outcome.
In the following section, I summarize the institutionalized action theory, which was first
formulated by March & Olsen (1989) and by March (1994) and later extended by Ocasio (1999),
and present a general model of organizational action that could be applied to the study of CEO
succession.
Institutionalized action theory: the role of organizational identities and rules
The institutionalized action theory portrays individuals, groups, and organizations as'
following rules and routines based on the logic of appropriateness in everyday decision (March
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& Olsen, 1989; March, 1994; Ocasio, 1999). As opposed to a decision maker in the rational
choice theory whose primary task is to analyze his preferences and the expectations of future
consequences, a decision maker in institutional theory of action is required to analyze the
situation, to establish his identity, and to match rules to recognized situation. Sirce the
interpretation of identity, rules and situation inevitably involves ambiguity, the decision maker
in rule-based decision making theory is far from being a cultural dope blindly following the
culturally defined norms.
Institutional logic provides an important source for organizational identity, although the
relationship between institutional logic and organizational identity is fundamentally recursive
(Haveman & Rao, 1997; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). As one type of
institutional logic gains legitimacy among major players within an organizational field, the
boards 6f directors are more likely to accept that institutional logic. When an institutional logic
is internalized, it becomes the organizational identity. Through various processes,
organizations can also shape institutional logic. A shift in dominant institutional logic may
start with a few firms, probably those in the margin rather than in the center (Hirsch, 1986),
adopting new organizational identities and practices creating a diversity in the organizational
identity pool. Other firms may or may not start to mimic the new identity. As the number of
such firms increases, the identity emerges as a new institutional logic.
Organizational stakeholders could also shape organizational identity through various political
processes. For example, when the firm borrows money from banks, it assumes a role as a
borrower. The identity as a borrower will be evoked in the contract. Similarly, when the top
management is negotiating with unions on employees' salary and working conditions, the
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identity as the employer for the employees is evoked and top management will follow certain
rules of conduct in its action. Large shareholders may also demand a seat on the board of
directors and influence the organizational identity. Thus, the demands and expectations from
multiple stakeholders are an important part of defining organizational identity. In a sense
organizational identity is the board's solution for the conflicting demands from multiple
stakeholders. The board may prioritize the demands of one stakeholder, or create an
organizational identity that integrates the interests of many stakeholders.
Varying sources of organizational identity suggest that a firm may have multiple identities
with conflicting behavioral rules for the organizational decision maker. An organizational
decision maker could minimize the role conflicts by bracketing the situations, allowing only
one organizational identity to dominate in a given situation (Jackall, 1988). In other words, the
recognition of the situation provides a cue for evoking one organizational identity, but not
others, and the behavioral rules attached to the identity. Differentiating the situation as normal
vs. crisis is also an important cue for evoking one organizational identity over other. Some
organizational stakeholders may find it easier to impose their own identity under a crisis
situation, while the board of directors may find it easier to refuse such pressure when things
are normal.
The board of directors is central in organizational identity formation. The board constructs
organizational identities by asking the question of what kind of firm it is. Just as an individual
asks the question of "Who am I?" when searching for one's own identity, an organization also
asks the question of "What are we as an organization?" (March, 1994). Although the question
seems quite generic and universal in defining organizational identity, the question could be
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raised in various ways which would lead to different answers. For example, if we ask 'What is
a firm?' in terms of the activities, the answer inevitably leads to emphasize the role of employee
in all those activities. If we ask 'who owns the firm' the answer has to address the property
ownership and will lead us to emphasize the shareholder. In the latter question, there is no
place for employee or even other stakeholders.
Although many studies have looked at the boards of directors as the locus where the powers of
stakeholders are adjusted, a closer look at board composition suggests why U.S. boards may be
more susceptible to institutional logic than those in other economies. Basically, most
stakeholders are not represented in the board, with an exception of large shareholders. Outside
directors are considered to provide an independent monitoring function, but they usually do
not represent any particular stakeholder. Interlocking directorates have been an especially
effective way of disseminating dominant institutional logics, be they capitalist values or new
merger and acquisition techniques (Useem, 1984; Haunschild, 1993).
Although we could say that rules follow from organizational identity conceptually, we often
infer organizational identity by observing the kind of rules individuals and organizations
follow, because identity is not always easily observable. Some identities are relatively easy to
identify, such as, gender, religion, and profession for individual identities and industry and
business groups for organizational identities, because these identities are based on explicit
membership. Other identities are difficult to identify, such as being a vegetarian or being a
liberal/conservative, because these identities are not based on explicit membership.
Nevertheless we could infer these unobservable identities, when we observe how individuals
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and organizations act and what kinds of rules they follow. Thus, organizational rules and
identity are like the two sides of one coin.
We need to be aware of the complex relationship between identity and rules, however. First of
all, rules may be also decoupled from organizational identities. For one thing, it takes a while
to learn the rules of identities. We go through extensive socialization. Take religion for
example. A person may acquire a new identity instantly as he or she accepts the basic tenets of
the religious teaching, but it may take time to learn the rules that will make him or her look like
a true member of the particular religion. Second, individual and organizational rules could
vary considerably, even when people have the same identity, reflecting the style and agency of
the person and the organization. Finally, individuals and organizations have multiple identities
and some of the rules learned from one identity may be spilled over to other identities.
These difficulties, however, reveal the complexity of how identity plays out in our everyday
life, rather than a problem with the theoretical construct. One of the important benefits of
having the concept of identities is that it allows us to understand why certain rules develop
within the organization. It allows us to see the commonalities behind the seemingly
idiosyncratic organizational rules.
It is worth mentioning the commonalities and differences between routines and rules. Both
routines and rules specify scripts about who participates, in what way, and how. They both
reduce uncertainty and coordinate activities. Organizational decision making processes and
outcomes become accountable and reliable as a result. Routines and rules, however, are
concerned with different aspects of individual and organizational action. Routines, on the one
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hand, have the elements of repetition and sequencing. They are a self-contained unit of
practices, such as standard operating procedures. The outcome is more or less predictable from
routines. Rules, on the other hand, do not need to be a unified system. Instead, rules deal with
uncertainty by specifying contingencies. Rules may be flexible. In many cases, routines and
rules go together. Rules may result in routinization, especially if the rules regulate the temporal
aspects of organizational process. Also, many routines include contingency rules that make the
routines reliable in various situations. Yet, routines are primarily used for transmitting
knowledge, while rules work as a political truce among multiple actors.
The relationship between institutional logic, power dynamics among actors, and organizational
identity make a full circle as they influence each other. Institutional logic and power dynamics
among actors shape organizational identities and rules, although organizational identities
could also affect institutional logics and power dynamics. Moreover, the relationship between
institutional logics and the power dynamics of stakeholders could also shape each other.
Figure 2-1 portrays the relationship between institutional logics, power dynamics among
actors, organizational identities, and organizational process/outcome. Figure 2-2 shows the
model applied to CEO succession.
Ideal types of organizational identities through the lens of organizational theories
The board of directors constructs organizational identities in the real world. One way to start a
study of organizational identity may be to interview boards of directors at firms of various
sizes, locations, and industries. If the purpose of the study is to identify dominant
organizational identities, however, we could also use the organizational theories as guidance
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since some of the organizational theories ask the question of 'What is an organization?' Not
only do they ask the same question as the boards of directors who try to construct
organizational identities, the answer they provide reflects the ideal type of organizational
identities in their own time. Even though most theories are presented in universal/absolute
language, thesetheories reflect the dominant institutional logics of their time about what it
means to be an organization. The closer they get to the reality, the more resonant the theory.
The classic is born. Some of these theories may get to the boards of directors through various
channels and may influence the process of identity formation in the real world.
Therefore, I review three models of the firm in organization theory as reflecting organizational
identities in the real world. The three models of the firm are: firm as community/institution
(Selznick, 1957), firm as shareholder's property (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen,
1983), and firm as a political coalition among dominant stakeholders (March, 1962; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). In the following section, I show that the three models of firm differ
systematically not only in how they view the firm and the role of CEO, but also in the set of
succession rules that firms will establish.
THE FIRM AS A COMMUNITY/INSTITUTION
The community view of the firm maintains that a business firm may develop a life of its own
and pursue a self-maintenance goal before a profit-maximization goal (Selznick, 1957; Ouchi,
1981). A key feature of this view is that it recognizes the firm as a social organism consisting of
people with needs for self-fulfillment and self-protection. In a community firm, members
identify emotionally with their firm and achieve personal satisfaction in it. Efficiency may
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follow as a result of members' commitment to their organizational success (Ouchi, 1981),
although the achievement of efficiency may not be the primary goal of a community firm.
Furthermore, intimacy may breed information sharing among organizational participants
which may be citical for knowledge creation and innovation within the firm (Nonaka, 1994).
The role of the top manager may be best described as a "leader" in a community firm, who
creates a mission and goal for organizational members, protects organizational integrity from
external pressure, and transforms organizational members, through educational processes,
from neutral, technical units to committed and sensitive participants (Selznick, 1957). Although
shareholders' demands are an important concern of a leader, they are treated as one of the
external forces that may threaten organizational integrity and stability and, thus, as something
the leader should protect against. In contrast employees gain priority as members of a
partnership.
The virtual lack of discussion of control mechanisms for top managers is not surprising, given
the assumption that top managers are the most committed persons in the whole organization
as a result of their extended service (Selzrick, 1957). The internalization of one's own mission
and value as well as the need for respect in the community are the strongest constraints
preventing the leader from taking advantage of his/her powerful position and acting greedily.
CEO succession, thus, does not have a disciplinary connotation in this model. The benign
leader, if he is not able to function as an effective leader, will plan for succession and probably
select a person from within the organization who knows the firm well enough to protect
organizational integrity.
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THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MAXIMIZING FIRM
Most of the discussion of corporate governance in the financial economics literature tends to
agree that the firm's primary goal for existence is to maximize the shareholder value. These
studies view the firm as the property of its shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama &
Jensen, 1983). We very often come upon such sentences as "The ultimate owners of a firm are
its shareholders." The separation of ownership and control in large public companies, however,
considerably complicates the reality. That is, managers, as agents of the shareholders, may not
have the same incentives as those of shareholders and may behave to maximize their own
interests, in what is called an agency problem. Managers' strategic position at the center of the
organizational decision making process aggravates the agency problem. Developing several
control mechanisms to align the incentive of agents more closely with the interests of
principals becomes a central concern for shareholders.
In this model of firm, the term "agent" best describes the role of the top management. Top
managers' primary goal is to please shareholders by improving performance, using their
specialized knowledge. In addition, a hierarchical structure develops to ensure that upper level
managers adequately supervise lower level managers to prevent agency problem at different
levels. Thus, organizational members are all agents of shareholders. Aligning the incentives of
managers at each level through explicit contracts and control devices is the key to the success
of such a system.
CEO succession (or dismissal) has a special disciplinary meaning in this modeL. In a time of.
poor performance, top managers are replaced by either the board of directors or the takeover
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market. Dismissal of managers can happen anytime at lower levels as well. Here, top managers
may lay off "excess" labor, without too much blame, true to their role of agents for
shareholders. The effectiveness of CEO succession as a disciplinary mechanism may depend on
both internal control mechanisms, such as the existence of strong and independent boards of
directors or the concentration of ownership, and external control mechanisms, such as the
efficient stockmarket and the active takeover market.
THE FIRM AS A POLITICAL COALITION
The firm as a political coalition was first conceptualized by March (1962) and has been
reintroduced in terms of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) in the
organizational theory literature and as multiple stakeholder theory in the corporate governance
literature (Freeman, 1983). Unlike a shareholder value maximizing firm or a community firm,
where either shareholders or employees are represented as having a superior claim over
organization's existence, the concept of the firm as a political coalition recognizes that
suppliers, customers, governmental agents as well as shareholders and employees have
distinctive existing and potential interests in the firm. These different groups supply the firm
with critical resources and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied. Since the
demands of one group may conflict with those of others, the goals of the firm have to be
negotiated. Different patterns of coalitions emerge, depending on the consistency or
complementarity of demands among participants (March, 1962), as well as the power and the
extent of the stake of each participant (Hill & Jones, 1992; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Hence,
analyzing complementarity of goals as well as the power of each participant is important in
understanding firm behavior. Furthermore, at any point in time, there may be a number of
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possible coalitions that are viable. Thus, the model allows dynamic change of coalitions over
time.
The role of the executive in the firm is best described by the term "political broker" (March,
1962), meaning someone who has to coordinate demands of different stakeholder groups. The
model also acknowledges that top managers may use the organization to maximize their own
utility. Because top managers are in the center of such bargaining processes, they can wield
enormous power over shaping goals to their own interests. However, they need to form
coalitions with other participants who have similar or complementary goals with top
management. Otherwise, the cost of maintaining the coalition becomes high enough that it
invites the emergence of a newly dominant coalition. In other words, difficulty in coordination
and control of stakeholder groups can impose constraints on top managers (Hill & Jones, 1992;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
CEO succession is viewed as reflecting a shift in coalition formation. Shifts in environmental
conditions, such as changes in technical, legal, and market conditions, are important for such
changes, since the shift may weaken the incumbent manager's ability to maintain the existing
coalition. Those who demonstrate their ability to adequately deal with the uncertainties of
environments may gain support from stakeholders and take over the top position.
Organizational identity in the firm as political coalition can be quite varied, as various
stakeholders may become a dominant coalition partner. Thus, we may be able to identify more
than three organizational identities in the real world. However, in the organizational literature,
the three models whose identities are summarized in Table 2-1 have been predominant.
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Although three models do not explicitly describe the rules that would be proper to each
organizational identity, we could nevertheless infer from the literature the general succession
rules in each model. The CEO succession rules for three models of firm are summarized in
Table 2-2.
Institutional logic, ower dynamics among stakeholders, and oranizational identities in
large U.S. corporations
(1) Institutional logic and organizational identity/rules
Several researchers noted that there has been a shift of dominant institutional logic that
accompanied the change in the key question for defining organizational identity. Useem (1993)
argues that with the rise of institutional investors since 1970s as well as the rise of hostile
takeover market during the 1980s, the nature of American business shifted from managerial
capitalism to institutional capitalism. The center of gravity moved from management to a new
breed of shareholders: institutional investors. Blair (1995) also makes a similar argument but
more explicitly links the change with organizational identity and argues that the conception of
the firm has changed from that of a social entity to that of the property of the shareholders. For
example, Blair writes "With the separation of ownership and control, the development of a
sophisticated securities market, and the emergence of a class of professional managers who
thought themselves as the 'trustees' of these great institutions, the social entity conception
began to take hold. The corporations assumed more and more responsibilities as social
institutions (Blair, 1995)." The equitable balancing of interests replaced the maximizing of
profit By the 1960s, the social entity view dominated the U.S. corporate scene.
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During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the conception of firm as community slowly gave way to
the conception of firm as shareholder's property in the U.S. Several changes in the environment
accompanied the shift in dominant institutional logic: the rise of global competition,
internationalization of financial markets, the emergence of the hostile takeover, and the rise in
the cost of capital in the early part of 1980s (Blair, 1995). The property concept was strongly
backed up by agency theory. The rise of institutional shareholders also had an important role
in propagating the property concept of the firm in the 1980s. Donaldson (1994) argues that
individual shareholders in the previous decade tended to be loyal to the firm they invested in
because of limited expertise and knowledge beyond that industry. The institutional investors
and professional money managers had a quite different span of knowledge and expertise,
which made them much more willing to sell the shares if they could find a better earning
opportunity in other industries. The growth of institutional investors, however, limited their
option for swift exit. They were not large enough to monitor individual firms and their boards,
but they were too big to exit without incurring loss. Some of the biggest institutional investors,
such as CALPERS, chose a strategy to improve the market as a whole and began to press for
governance reform based on the logic of shareholder's property (Davis & Thompson, 1994).
The latest shareholder revolution was an important departure from the shareholder logic in the
early days when the owner-manager controlled the firm. While the early version of the logic of
shareholder's property depended on the power of shareholders who had a large block of
shares, the new shareholder logic regarded all shareholders, large or small, as genuine owners
of the firm. Unlike the early version where large shareholders may be able to pursue varied
interests in the organizations, such as seeking employment opportunity for family members
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and other perquisites as a special shareholder, if they wish to, the latest version demands that
large shareholders be faithful to the role of shareholder focusing only on share performance.
The characteristics of firms that adopt a new organizational identity could also facilitate or
hamper the shift in institutional logic. When the large and prestigious firms start to adopt a
new organizational identity, the organizational identity will acquire legitimacy and may
encourage others to change the identity, which will bring the change in institutional logic.
Donaldson (1994) documents that some of the more successful restructuring in the 1970s and
1980s came from firms whose management actively adopted the shareholder rhetoric.
Although Donaldson does not discuss the impact of these successful financial restructurings on
the larger institutional context and on other firms, it is likely that they had a positive role in the
shift to the shareholder logic. Hirsch (1986)'s fascinating analysis of the linguistic framing of
hostile takeovers also shows the shift in dominant institutional logic as more and more
prestigious firms were involved in hostile takeover activities.
There is some evidence that succession rules have also changed over the years reflecting the
change in dominant institutional logic. For example, Vancil (1987) identified a few succession
rules that have been common in the large U.S. corporation in 1985 and before. Some of the
rules were: (1) The CEO takes the initiative in the succession process; (2) Successors are
groomed through two different organizational rules; and (3) CEOs have a limited tenure,
although it may vary by company and by CEO. These rules are highly consistent with the
succession rules that follow from the organizational identity of community.
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More recent reports on CEO succession shows that more CEOs are forced to early retirement
by active boards (Neff & Ogden, 1999). Boards are more willing to take charge of the succession
process. A CEO is more likely to be fired when performance is poor. In other words, the
succession rules show that organizational identity as shareholder's property has become more
popular in the 1990s.
The change in dominant institutional logic and the resulting reconstruction of organizational
identity by the board need not bring a complete change in succession rules. As Oliver (1991)
has suggested, management can use different strategies, such as avoiding, resisting, and
acquiescing. The board could bracket the organizational identity as shareholder's property into
confined governance issues, as in the form of executive compensation, and keep the
community identity in other areas of decision making, including CEO succession. Moreover,
when the succession rules are formalized they are more likely to survive even when a firm
accepts a new organizational identity.
(2) Power and organizational identity
Political theories of the firm, such as political coalition theory (March, 1962) and resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), capture the basic process through which
dominant stakeholders shape goals. It is through a direct 'relationship' that stakeholders affect
organizational identity. The concrete interaction situation is a very powerful way to invoke
organizational identity. Having a representative on the board is one of the major ways to
impose a particular identity in every major organizational decision, including CEO succession.
The size of the stake matters as well.
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Two categories of stakeholders that had direct influence in shaping organizational identity
through board membership are large shareholders and financial institutions. Since Salancik and
Pfeffer (1980) studied the role of ownership in the tenure of the CEO, many studies have
confirmed that concentrated ownership made a difference in the succession process and
outcomes. In addition to shareholders, financial institutions also had a close relationship with
the organizations by sending representatives to the corporate board to represent their interests.
Mintz and Schwartz (1985) provided the list of CEO change events that involved bank or other
financial institutions. But they caution that banks worked through hegemony rather than direct
'control.'
The power dynamics between top management and dominant stakeholders make the
organizational rules more flexible. Dominant stakeholders can define key contingencies.
Moreover, rules can be broken if the situation changes - for example, if one of the stakeholders
gains more power. Thus, even when the social entity firms prevailed, large shareholders as
well as financial institutions were able to take charge, and they may continue to wield a special
power over boardroom politics, even as the identity changes.
The most consistent contingency rule has been CEO succession under poor performance. The
relationship between dominant stakeholders and organizational identity/rules is also dynamic.
Firms with a particular organizational identity can change the power dynamics among
stakeholders by carefully selecting their interaction partners. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue
that top management actively seeks cooptation of external stakeholders. If such efforts are not
successful, top management and the board of directors could also choose who would be their
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dominant stakeholders. For example, Useem (1996) showed that top management actively
recruited shareholders who would be more sympathetic toward the prevailing managerial
ideology.
The rise of the institutional investor is interesting because institutional investors differ from
earlier dominant stakeholders in their power base and in the strategy for controlling the firm.
The influence of institutional investors has been reported as crucial in CEO succession in large
firms in the 1990s (Stewart, 1993). The behavior of large institutional investors in the 1990s is
rather different from the traditional role of large shareholders, however. For one thing, some of
the more powerful institutional shareholders had less then 1% of shares in large firms, but they
spread their shareholdings broadly across companies as a result of the practice called indexing.
Their power was based on the fact that the total sum of funds organized by them was very
large, and on the fact that other investors watched them closely as providing signals of the
potential value of companies. In other words, they were powerful not because of the size of
their stake in individual firms, but because they were powerful institutions in themselves.
Similarly, some of the poorly performing firms were targeted as a warning to all companies,
not because they were particularly dependent on institutional shareholders for capital.
(3) Interaction between institution and power.
Stakeholders could make an independent effort to change the rules of the game at the higher
institutional level, which will affect organizational identity formation. For example, Davis and
Thompson (1994) show that institutional investors acted collectively to change the disclosure
rules for CEO compensation. Thus, institutional investors have influenced corporate
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governance by promoting the logic of maxinmzing shareholder value, which may have been an
effective strategy for sustaining the behavioral change.
One of the reasons why shareholders were able to keep power collectively, if not individually,
is the continued existence of the takeover market. Although these takeovers may have been
friendly, it nevertheless forced firms to think about the significance of ownership in large
public corporations2.
Institutional logic also shapes the power bases for stakeholders, creating different types of
contingencies for CEO succession processes and outcomes. For example, Thornton & Ocasio
(1999) found that a shift in logics in the publishing industries -from editorial logic to market
logic - led to different determinants of executive succession.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have suggested the institutional theory of action to understand the complex
interplay among institutional logics, the power dynamics among stakeholders, and
organizational identity and rules that shape CEO succession process and outcome. The model
provides an alternative interpretation of the role of the board of directors in the period prior to
the 1980s, when the board was portrayed as basically serving the interests of the CEO. An
alternative interpretation is that the boards shared the community logic in which the CEO was
his is quite different from Japan where contest for control has not truly happened for more than 50
years. There were mergers and acquisitions but most of the mergers were 'brotherly' mergers, where the
employees of each company are respected. It may be one of the reasons why the logic of shareholder
property has been so resisted among Japanese firms, despite the extensive debate on the nature of firms
among academics during the 1990s.
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considered as the benign leader who has an ability to pick the best person for the firm's future.
It is true, however, that when some of the CEOs ignored the appropriate code of conduct (for
example, by using the firm to enlarge their personal interests as opposed to serving the firm),
the community logic deprived the boards of directors of the power and rhetoric to initiate CEO
succession.
The alternative logic, the firm viewed as maximizing shareholder value, took shape as the
shareholders gained power through the active takeover market and through the growth of
institutional investors in the 1980s. The change explains some of the inconsistencies in
portraying the process and outcome of CEO succession. While Vancil (1987) suggested that
90% of the firms had a 'normal' CEO succession where CEOs themselves played a greater role
in the process, later CEO succession studies show that boards of directors were more willing to
fire under conditions of poor performance.
The model also shows that dominant stakeholders could affect CEO succession indirectly by
engaging in the ideological battle to shape a new institutional logic, which has been neglected
in the previous CEO succession literature that focused on the direct political process. The
efforts of institutional investors to change the disclosure rule for executive compensation is an
example.
Institutional logic and the way it shapes organizational identities and rules are important even
when there is no shift in the dominant institutional logic. In the next chapter, I flesh out the
dominant institutional logic and stakeholders of the Japanese economy and show how these
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two distinctive sources of organizational identities and rules shape CEO succession processes
and outcomes in Japan.
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Figure 2-1. General Model of organizational decision making from Institutionalized Action
Theory.
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Table 1. Three ideal types of organizational identities and their main characteristics
Organizational Firm as a Firm as shareholder's Firm as dominant
Identities community/social property coalition
entity/institution
Supporting Institutional Agency theory Resource
theories theory Portfolio theory dependence theory
Organizational Multiple
culture and stakeholder theory
leadership
Mission Organizational Increase profits in Please dominant
survival through order to create coalition partners:
growth as well as shareholder wealth increase profits,
profits extend business
relationship, etc.
The role of Leader Agent of Political broker
CEO shareholders
Legitimacy Rank in hierarchy Stock performance Relationship with
the dominant
coalition partner
Hierarchy at CEO assumes the CEO at the bottom CEO as hub among
the top top leadership for of the hierarchy of various
the organization shareholder-board- stakeholders
as well as for the CEO
boards
The structure CEO at the top of Separation of CEO Representation of
of the board CEO-board- and chairman dominant
stakeholders Independenceof stakeholder in the
hierarchy. board through board
higher outsider The board stands
ratio above CEO
The meaning Symbolic event to Disciplinary tool to Failure in
of CEO celebrate the align the interests maintaining the
succession continuity as a of top managers dominant coalition.
community with owners
Ownership Dispersed Institutional Concentrated
characteristics ownership ownership ownership
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Table 2. Organizational identity and rules of CEO succession
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Organizational Community/Social Shareholders Political coalition
Identities entity property
Who initiates the CEO initiated Board initiated Dominant
CEO succession stakeholder who
process? sits in the board
Preference for Prefer insider Prefer outsider Prefer outsiders
successor with close tie to the
dominant
stakeholder
Selection process Succession as larger Search firm
managerial training
Timing of Decoupling with Strong coupling Coupling with
succession performance with share performance
Limited tenure performance measure that is ofinterest to the
coalition partner
Chapter 3. Stakeholders and the institutional context of CEOfshacho succession in Japan
Guided by the model of institutional theory of action developed in Chapter 2,I review
Japanese corporate governance in terms of two key aspects: dominant institutional logic and
dominant stakeholders that control industrial firms. In the following, I first give a brief
summary of the key features of Japanese corporate governance system and compare them with
the U.S. corporate governance system. Second, I review the nature of the board and its
relationship to organizational identity. Third, I review the logic of community that has been
dominant in the Japanese economy in the post WWII period and how the institutional logic
affected organizational identities and succession rules in managerial firms. Fourth, I review the
nature of dominant stakeholders of large Japanese firms and how they affect organizational
identities and succession rules. Finally, I conclude with some of the areas on which I shall focus
in the thesis.
Tapanese corporate governance in comparative perspective: A summary
A long line of studies on Japanese corporate governance (Aoki, 1984; Porter, 1992; Hoshi,
Kashyap, & Sharfstein, 1990; Prowse, 1990; Kester, 1991; Gerlach, 1992; Kaplan, 1994; Kojima,
1997; Dore, 1973, 1987; Dore, Lazonick, & O'Sullivan, 1999) have explicitly contrasted the
Japanese system with corporate governance systems of the U.S and U.K. The U.S. corporate
governance, which may be characterized as governance through the market, is based on the
property view of the firm, where shareholders have the ultimate say. The existence of well-
developed security markets allows firms to raise capital trough equity. Thus, controi is based
on equity holding. The shareholders and the management usually hold an arm's length
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relationship since shareholders find it relatively easy to exit from the firm through market
transactions. The dispersed nature of their shareholding makes exit an easier alternative than
voicing their concern to management. Although the shareholder revolution in the 1980s was
able to better align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders' by forcing
managers to own part of the shares, the basic characteristics of the financial market and the
relationship with other shareholders remain more or less the same.
On the other hand, Japanese corporate governance, which is often described as relational
governance, is based on the community view of the firm. The institutional background is weak
financial markets. Firms mainly rely on debt for their capital and form long-term relationship
with principal banks, so-called main banks. The banks maintain control over borrowing firms
through dense flows of information. Main banks often complement their relationship with focal
firms by holding blocks of shares (up to 5% of the total) or by exchanging personnel.
The board of directors
The board is important in constructing organizational identities and rules. The composition of
the board is important because individual board members bring in their own identity in a
larger society as they construct organizational identity within the board. One of the dimensions
that has been emphasized in the U.S. is the proportion of outsider directors on the board. As
outsiders, they are more likely to be independent from the CEO, and thus provide reliable
monitoring roles. These outsiders also form an interlocking directorship network that allows
new ideas and information to travel across firms, which may have an important implication in
the organizational identity formation.
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The distinction between inside directors and outside directors is less relevant for the Japanese
board, however. There is no "outside" director in the U.S. sense, as most of the directors are
either present or former full-time employees in the firm for which they are a director. Then,
what are the important dimensions of the Japanese board that influence organizational identity
formation? As an illustration, I have summarized the composition and the structure of the
board at Sumitomo Metal Industry in 1995 in Table 3-2. One of the largest firms in the steel
industry, Sumitomo Metal Industries had sales of $8.25 billion and employed 19, 796 in 1990. It
was incorporated in 1935 and is a member of Sumitomo keiretsu -one of the six horizontal
keiretsu in Japan. The structure of the board is typical of the boards in most Japanese firms. In
fact, the titles of the rank hierarchy is one of the firmly institutionalized features of top
management teams. The composition is also typical among large managerial firms, although it
may also include one or two family members in family controlled firms.
Several things could be said from Table 3-2. First, the board is mainly populated by insiders.
Twenty-seven out of 33 directors were insiders who have been with the firm for more than 30
years. As for the six outside directors, two are from government bureaucracies -a vice
president from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and a director from the
Ministry of Construction; two are from Japan Stainless Co. which was merged with Sumitomo
Metal Industries in 1991; and two are external auditors who had previously been affiliated with
Sumitomo Bank and the Public Prosecutor's Office, respectively. Second, the chairman position
is separated from the CEO & President (shacho) position. The chairman had previously been
the CEO & President of Sumitomo Metals Industries for seven years before assuming the office
of chairman. Third, the structure of the board is hierarchical. The hierarchical nature of
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Japanese board is closely related to the fact that most board members are insiders. The rank
hierarchy of the top management team is applied to the board of directors. Fourth, the
seniority principle is well respected in the board. The officers in the same rank hierarchy are
from a narrow entry cohort and the average age and average tenure with the company of
officers increase linearly with the rank hierarchy. Finally, despite the strict hierarchy in the
board, it is interesting to note that the chairman, CEO & President (shacho), vice president, and
senior executive directors shared the representative rights, indicating the collective decision
making process within the Japanese top management team.
The shacho is conventionally viewed as the equivalent of CEO in the U.S., although there have
been a few cases where the term Chief Executive Officers (CEO) was used to designated
chairman (kaicho). There are several grounds why it is more appropriate to consider shacho as
the equivalent of CEO. First, in many firms the office of chairman is an informal position for
the retiring shacho, which is not specified in the formal company articles. The formal authority
of the shacho is reflected in the fact that while the office of chairman is often left open when the
chairman resigns unexpectedly, the office of shacho is never left open. Second, the shacho has the
power to control the succession process, such as the timing of succession as well as the
selection of his successors. Unlike the COO (Chief Operating Officer) of the U.S., the shacho is
rarely dismissed by the chairman, although they may move on to less prestigious offices than
the chairman, such as the vice chairman or advisor, if they showed poor performance as a
shacho. While using the title of CEO for chairman has become more popular among Japanese
firms in the 1990s in Japanese business firms, it would be misleading to think of Japanese
chairman/CEO as holding the same power and responsibility as Chiairman/CEO in the U.S. In
order to avoid the confusion, I will use the terin shacho instead of CEO in the Japanese context.
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What does the composition and structure of the board tell us about the function of the board?
First, the board functions as an extension of the career ladder at the top echelon. There is a
considerable overlap between the top management team and the board of directors. There is no
such thing as an independent board member overlooking the top management team's
decisions. Even the dispatched directors (outside directors, as explained below) are expected to
contribute substantially as a member of the top management team. Even though Japanese
commercial law defines the board of directors as having responsibility for monitoring firm
performance, Japanese boards formally endorse decisions made by a subset of their own
members, the acting top management team.
The role of monitoring firm performance is often performed instead by the dominant
stakehoiders, who can gather detailed information through the dispatched directorship
network (explained below). As we could see from the six outside directors of Sumitomo Metal
Industries, Japanese firms allow a few powerful stakeholders to have direct representation of
their interests on the board through a unique system of director exchange, the so called
"dispatched directorship". There are three sources from which dispatched directors come-the
main bank, governmert bureaucracies, and other industrial companies. These dispatched
directors may be also seen as shareholder representatives, as, with the exception of former
government bureaucrats, they are bolstered by the shareholding position of their sending
institution. Through the dispatched directorship, information flows more easily between the
firm and its stakeholders, allowing stakeholders to influence policy as well as participate in
shaping organizational identity.
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Interpreting the role of the dispatched directorship requires some caution. Despite the apparent
backup of the dispatched directors by the dominant stakeholders, dispatched directors may not
be as influential as the insiders on the board because of the board's hierarchical nature.
Dispatched directors may help information flow and monitoring, even leading some of the
important decision making, but they cannot affect the ground rules of organizational decision
making nor the choice of timing and successors. If the dominant stakeholders are truly
interested in shaping organizational identities, they must sometimes send a dispatched director
as the shacho, not as an ordinary director in the lower rank. In other words, who the shacho is,
where he comes from, and how he was selected are important indicators in the development of
organizational identities and rules.
If the interests of creditors, aliance partners, and the government are partially protected
through direct representation, the interests of employee groups are protected quite firmly
through the normative commitment by the board of directors. As most of the board members
are insiders, who have worked for the company for all their adult life, they are likely to be
committed to the goal of preserving their firm -their lifetime community. The lack of an
external labor market for top executives, combined with getting the second job through their
organization, also makes their interest keenly related to the long term survival of the firm. And
the primary beneficiary of this long term commitment is the employee.
The community logic, managerial firm and succession rules
The logic of community in Japan shares many commorn features with the social entity
conception of firm that developed in the U.S. during 1950s and 1960s. The logic is closely
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related to the managerial revolution where ownership and control was separated and
ownership dispersed among many anonymous shareholders. The employee was the most
important stakeholder in the community conception and long-term employment was
encouraged. The CEO and shacho acted as the leader of the community rather than the agent of
external stakeholders. In fact, such commonalities are not surprising because many Japanese
firms in the 1950s were trying quite consciously to model American firms, most of which were
following the community logic (Saito, 1995). In fact, long-term employment and the formation
of internal labor market based on the seniority principle have been quite common in large firms
in most advanced economies (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).
Yet, there are subtle differences that make Japanese community logic quite distinctive. Just for
convenience, and following the notation used by Aoki (1988), 1 will refer to J-type community
firm for the community logic developed in Japan, and A-type community firm for the
community logic developed in the U.S.
In the J-type community firm, the interests of core employees were protected firmly. To begin
with, the boundary of the core employee group was extended to include blue collar workers as
well as white collar workers (Lazonick, 1991)1. The relative precedence of employees as a group
is also revealed in the diversification strategy. Compared to the U.S. corporations, Japanese
firms have eschewed diversification that would take them out of their main line products and
core business (Clark, 1979; Kagono et al, 1985). The diversification into unrelated fields and
starting a new venture would require that they recruit and provide a costly long-term
SLazonick (1991) argues that the inclusion of the white collar workers within the core management
boundary in the U.S. firm was in itself an important departure from the firms in the U.K. where only the
top management was acknowledged as the insider.
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employment commitment to a new cadre of workers. If the venture were to fail, firms could
not lay those employees off as easily as in the U.S. Thus, lifetime employment forces Japanese
companies to be cautious about extending themselves into an area where they possess no prior
experience, related expertise, or comparative advantage2. The commitment to long-term
employment also explains the Japanese corporation's preference for networks of subsidiaries
instead of expanding through vertical integration. With subsidiaries, parent companies have
the leeway of reassigning surplus employees, an important safety valve for the cumulative
pressures of permanent employment, without needing to provide the same treatment for the
employees of subsidiaries.
The personnel practices were elaborated in orderto encourage life-time employment with the J-
type community firm. Job-hopping was morally condemned. The seniority principle, as in
everyday life in Japan, became much more sophisticated as it was applied to promotion and
reward, backed up by centralized personnel practices. It should be noted that the sophistication
of the seniority principle does not mean the lack of competition (Hanada, 1989). It was rather
that competition was structured in a way that limited the competition to a narrow age cohort.
The resulting seniority often does not reveal the intense competition within the narrow age
cohort.
While the A-type community firm put more emphasis on social responsibility of the firm, the J-
type community firm put more emphasis on the continuity of the firm as an institution. The
2 Tecommitment to career-long employment may have opposite effects in diversification strategy in
declining industries (Okimoto, 1989). In these industries, companies may actively seek ways to diversify
even into unrelated ones, to ensure career-long employment.
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social responsibility is narrowly defined in terms of core economic activities, such as
manufacturing better products, rather than engaging in corporate philanthropy.
Let me elaborate on the institutionalization of the business firm in Japan. The firm as an
institution/community is different from the firm that has the employee group as a dominant
stakeholder (Dore, 1973; Itami, 1994). The firm as a community/institution develops a distinct
'identity' that is independent of any stakeholders, including the employees. The legitimacy of
stakeholders is evaluated by the commitment they show in preserving the firm. Employees are
given priority not by membership, but by the commitment they show to preserve the
organizational identity. Such community-centered behavior is also found in pre-modem
merchant households (Miyamoto, 1995,1998). For example, although most merchant
households followed the principle of primogeniture in succession if possible, they also
explicitly looked for successors who were best for continuing the household name when they
did not have an adequate son to take over. Thus, they would adopt a son-in-law and make him
continue the household name. In other words, the need to preserve the household name takes
priority over the need to create employment opportunities for family members. As Seiznick has
put it, the firm acquires a life of its own distinct from the technical purpose for which it was
created.
Succession rules under the J-type community logic have many similarities with community
logic in the U.S. The shacho initiates the whole process with close consultation with the
personnel department. Basically, the shacho determines when he will retire and who his
successor will be. The board has virtually no control over the selection process, except that the
directors themselves are the candidates for the next shacho. There is a strong preference for an
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insider as the successor shacho. Among the two hundred large industrial firms in 1990s, 80
percent of the firms chose an insider as a new shacho. Itami's study shows that there are strong
industry-wide rules on the appropriate length of shacho tenure (4 to 6 years) suggesting the
decoupling of performance and shacho departure (Itami, 1995). In a sense, the shacho in Japanese
firms seems to fit quite well with the benign leader portrayed in the institutional theory of
leadership, who is most committed to the organizational mission set by himself and by his
predecessor.
Several historical developments were influential in making such a difference between the two
types of community logic. To begin with, the community identity is a product of concrete
interaction between top managers and labor (Gordon, 1985). It is important to understand the
characteristics of top managers that shape the process. In Japan, professional managers' access
to the top situation was inadvertently made possible by the reforms initiated by the Allied
Occupation after the World War II, which Miyajima calls 'a management revolution from
above' (Miyajima, 1993). Believing that the key officers of large firms were active proponents of
military government, the Allied Occupation ordered an economic purge which required the
key executives to resign from their posts and banned them from any further public service.
Under the "Law for the Termination of Zaibatsu Family Control" in 1948, the number of
companies and company officers designated as the subjects of the Great Purge were 1,681
companies and 3,668 officers. Although the designation was canceled in 1951, the economic
purge brought a generational change and a new breed of young managers rose to the top
position. For example, the average age of presidents or chairmen of the board in 1951 was 51.8;
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at war's end, 60.2 years (Hadley, 1970). Although there was a cancellation of the designation in
1951, it did not bring old timers back to the top executive suites.
Several characteristics of newly appointed top managers are worth mentioning, since they are
closely related to the development of the Japanese corporate governance system in the
following years. Most of the top managers who replaced the purged officers were promoted
from inside. They had minimal experience as board members and had almost no connection
with the owner family. They were much more sympathetic to labor's demands and were aware
of the importance of a stable relationship with labor, while fighting firmly against the leftist
unions (Dore, 1973; Gordon, 1985, 1998; Miyajima, 1993; Yonekura, 1993).
The development of a permanent employment system epitomizes the process through which
the employee group became a powerful stakeholder in Japanese corporate governance (Marsh
& Mannari, 1971; Nakagawa, 1993; Sugayama, 1995). When the war ended, firms were left with
excess capacity and hundreds of thousands of employees faced massive layoffs. At the same
time, the Occupation allowed labor to organize more easily, as a part of democratization of the
economic system, which brought the rapid formation of organized labor unions in this period.
With the newly gained power from revised labor law, labor unions fought vehpmently against
top managers. The labor unions demanded job security as well as wage increases, because
instability in the job market threatened the lives of most employees. In the negotiation process,
it was the company unions, not the industry based unions, that were more successful in
dealing with the top management. The dominance of company unions combined with their
SBy looking at the ages of top executives in 1953, Miyajima (1993) makes it clear that most of the purged
executives, despite the later political events which cleared their name, did not come back to run the
company again.
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demand for job security set the ground for the establishment of the permanent employment
system in the following years. The chronic labor shortage during the high-growth period was a
significant factor promoting lifetime employment.
What was the reaction of the dominant stakeholders? For one thing, the bank has been the
biggest supporter of the J-type community firm, although the support is limited to the firms
that are not in significant trouble. It may be related to the fact that the bank itself also accepted
the community logic. An ethnographic study of a Japanese bank by Rohlen (1974) revealed that
Japanese banks were organized to secure a common livelihood and way of life for their
employees, even more so than industrial firms. The bank in Rohlen's study shares the features
of J-firm described by Aoki (1984,1994): low turnover rate among male employees, life-time
employment, the ideology of the firm as a big family, and hierarchical structure of the top
management. Main banks may have provided the industrial firms a model for running an
organization. The prestige of banks as an ideal workplace among college graduates may have
encouraged industrial firms to adopt some, if not all, of the personnel practices that guarantee
job security.
Community logics have been challenged as Japanese firms experienced several economic crises
during the post World War II period, yet have shown remarkable resiliency. For example, the
two oil shocks were a test of employee centered community logic. Although firms had to trim -
down quite a bit, the communnity logic was still kept since the large firms were relatively
successful in keeping the rules of community logic. Thus, employee centered characteristics
were tied with prestige and made it more ideologically correct for Japanese business society. In
other words, the diversification strategy that reflected the employee-centered nature of
62
Japanese firms was able to keep the myth amidst the economic crisis. Also, top management
showed good will toward protecting the organizational identity as a community and its core
employees through various actions, such as the shacho and the chairman resigning voluntarily
after major downsizing. Mroczkowski and Hanaoka (1997) show that the tradition of putting
employee interests first has also continued, where cutting the workforce was taken as a last
resort, not a first resort. In a sense, the J-type community logic is a community logic that puts
"community" or "firm" even before the interests of employees.
Dominant stakeholders and variations in organizational identities
Japanese firms are more diverse than most literature on Japanese corporate governance may
suggest. The diversity within the Japanese business could be best revealed if we understand
the role of dominant stakeholders in shaping organization identity and rules. It is important to
bear in mind that the general categories of stakeholders that are the focus of discussion in the
U.S. case do not fit well for Japan. In the Japanese context, specific social actors, rather than sets
of actors, dominate the political structures of firms. These are discussed in more detail below,
but they include the main bank, family owners, and specific government departments or
ministries. In certain corporations, specific organizations not only have a large stake, often
symbolized by some shareholding, but they are also powerful institutional actors in their own
right. They acquire legitimacy not only from their interaction with the firm in which they have
a stake, but also from their status within the larger business system and within the Japanese
society. These dominant stakeholders left distinctive footprints in organizational identity and
rules.
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(1) A note on shareholders: the multiplexity of relationships
Shareholders in Japan are often described as not having any superior claim over the firm (e.g.
Aoki, 1988). Although shareholders' rights are also protected by law, as in the U.S., the concept
of the firm as maximizing shareholder value has been foreign to both management and
shareholders themselves. This point was illustrated quite vividly in the 1980s, when top
managers were asked to rank their priorities in company policy decision. Share price and
shareholders' interest took almost last place in the top managers' priority lists (Abbeglen &
Stalk, 1985; Itami, 1994).
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that Japanese shareholders are completely ignored by
management. Japanese shareholders can be divided into two different types, or classes: 1) long-
term stable shareholders, accounting for about 70 percent of the whole equity market; and 2)
short-term shareholders, usually individual shareholders, accounting for the remaining 30
percent.
Table 3-3 shows the types of shareholders in the publicly traded firms in Japan. The table
indicates that various stakeholders -banks, government, individual, and other industrial
firms -hold shares for different reasons.
The unique feature of Japanese corporate governance lies in the fact that share ownership is
deeply embedded in the on-going business activities and that share ownership is used as a
token of stable long-term relationship rather than as a means to maximize profit or as a means
of control. When we examine the composition of the largest, say top 10, shareholders in large
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industrial firms, we notice that shares are owned by various stakeholders: creditors, alliance
partners, government supported funds, and the founding family. Share ownership by
stakeholders shows the most distinctive feature of Japanese corporate governance-the
multiplexity of relationships. Relationship takes precedence over the narrow stakeholder
interests.
In conclusion, management's low priority given to share price is, in a sense, a recognition of
the long-term needs of shareholders rather than a neglect of shareholders' needs. Moreover,
some of the long-term shareholders achieve what they want in the business transaction with
firms in which they hold shares. It is smaller shareholders who are treated with little respect.
(2) Main bank and the change of identity
The role of main banks has been discussed extensively in Japanese corporate governance
literature. An important feature of the Japanese main bank system is the role differentiation
between the main bank and other creditors. The main bank alone does not hold a large enough
equity stake to control the company, but its power is significant as other creditors delegate the
monitoring role to the main bank (Aoki, 1994; Sheard, 1994; Teranishi, 1994). The additional
monitoring costs are often compensated through the privilege of having business transactions
with the firm. The monitoring role is reciprocal among the main banks as the 10 largest city
banks, who usually assume the role of main bank, also own blocks of shares (up to 5%) in firms
even where they are not the main bank. Main banks also have distinct behavioral norms
expected of them. The requirements for being a main bank include the willingness to supply
capital and to support restructuring of the interested firms in times of financial difficulties, and
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to take the final credit risk. In order to fulfill these roles, main banks actively put effort into
training personnel to have management capabilities.
Monitoring by a main bank is mainly achieved by dispatching directors to the lending firm.
Table 3-4 shows a list of the 10 largest main banks and the number of directors they dispatch to
industrial firms. It is useful to distinguish between the regular flow of dispatched directors and
the emergency flow of dispatched directors. In the regular flow, only one or two directors are
dispatched as external auditors. In emergency flow, the number of the dispatched may increase
significantly, and dispatched directors assume the higher rank within the top executive
hierarchy, such as senior managing directors, vice president, and even shacho. The hierarchical
nature of the Japanese board and the special role expectations for the shacho make this high
level intervention necessary.
The changes in governance structure aim at preserving the organizational identity, rather than
dismantling the firm. Turnaround is expected. The main bank bears the risk and become more
like a manager or a restructuring specialist. The mission for the bank-dispatched shacho is to
help the firm become independent again, so that the firm could be run by an inside manager
again. In a sense, we may-even say that it is main banks that charige their identity from lender
to manager.
The intervention tends to be long because restructuring may take a long time. A main bank
may prevent a troubled firm from faltering, but complete revival requires luck and ingenious
leadership. One of the successful turnarounds that came after long years of main bank
intervention is Asahi Breweries. Since Asahi Breweries first started to accept shacho from
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Sumitomo Bank in 1971, it took more than a decade and two additional dispatched shachos
from Sumitomo Bank before it finally made a dramatic increase in sales and profit under the
leadership of shacho Higuchi. Thus, once the main bank controls the office of shacho, it is more
likely that the next shacho will also come from the main bank until the firm is ready to go it
alone. In other words, the rule of outsider selection is established.
(2) Industrial firm/Parent company and the organizational identity of an offspring
Sizable numbers of publicly traded firms in Japan have other industrial firms as major
stockholders. The purpose of ownership is to control the top management and production
process and to solidify the relationship between firms rather than to profit from the ownership
(Asanuma, 1994; Westney, 1996; Higuchi, 1997). This type of relationship is also called keiretsu
in Japan, but it is quite different from the six large horizontal keiretsu in which the relationship
among member firms is less vertical. As an illustration, I show the list of semi-subsidiary firms
of Toyota Motors by industry in Table 3-5. The table includes only the publicly traded firms
within the Toyota group. Among the 24 firms in Table 3-5, eight firms were ranked within the
top 200 manufacturing firms in 1980, which shows that vertical keiretsu groupings exist at all
levels of firm size. If we include the firms that are not publicly traded, the number of firms that
cooperate with Toyota Motors could go up to 187 for the parts companies, 66 for the facility
(setsun) related firms. If we count the second and third tiers of the keiretsu, the number is
virtually impossible to count. Similar vertical keiretsu groupings could be found at major large
industrial firms.
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The organizational identity of partially-owned, spinoff firms could be best described as an
'offspring.' In fact, a Japanese word for subsidiary is 'kogaisha,' which literally means a 'child
company.' Although the term kogaisha is usually reserved for the wholly owned subsidiaries in
Japan, the spirit of parent-child relationship still holds in the case of spinoff firms. If the
relationship between an infant and his parents describes the kind of relationship that kogaisha
has with its parent company, the relationship between an adolescent and her parent describes
the kind of relationship that a spinoff has with its parent company. Although the spinoff
company still depends on its parents for important resources, such as capital, management
talent, and marketing, it nevertheless tries to maintain its independence. Moreover, when a
semi-subsidiary firm does outgrow the parent company, it takes care of the needs of its parent
company, just as sons and daughter support their aging parents (Ito & Rose, 1994; Ito, 1995).
The power of top executives in the spin-off firms, including the shacho, comes from their ties
with the parent company. One of the important succession rules for spinoff companies is that
the shacho at the spinoff company does not have complete autonomy in choosing his successor.
He has to consult the parent company for his successor. Many top executives at spinoff firms
have been hired by the parent company at one point. Such a trend is especially strong in the
early years of spinoff firms, because the lack of external labor market forces complete
dependence on the parent companies for labor: In later years, however, the semi-subsidiary
firms may still accept top executives from the parent company in order to facilitate
coordination and communication with its parent company. Again, the outsider succession rule
is established in the semi-subsidiary firms.
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The relation between parent and semi-subsidiary companies may have different origins. First,
quite a few firms are created as a division of the parent company and are later spun off. For
example, Toyota Motors was a spinoff from Toyoda Automatic Loom, and Fujitsu was a
spinoff from Fuji Electric. The two firms are also examples where the semi-subsidiary company
outgrew the parent company. Spinoffs are often used as a strategy to participate in emerging
markets (Ito, 1995). By creating a separate entity a company could reduce the risk for
complete failure. It could reap the benefits of a young organization. Second, some of the
smaller firms chose other larger, stronger firms within the same industry as affiance partners,
giving them security through increased capital, technological support, and managerial support.
Such a trend was especially strong in the automobile industries. For example, Daihatsu and
Hino became part of the Toyota groups during the 1960s as a way to ward off foreign
companies. Finally, separate firms were established in order to encourage competition within
the same group. Firms that were kept separate for the same reason include Japan Victor
Company of Matsushita and Tokyo Sanyo of Sanyo Corporation.
(3) Founding family and the identity of family firm (dozoku kaisha)
Chandler (1977) asserts that most family firms will in the long run be transformed into
managerially controlled firms. In that sense, family firms could be thought of as firms in
transition. The path of the transition, however, may vary across firms. The timing of the
transition may also vary depending on the unique history of the firm. Until that transition
actually happens, family members remain the dominant stakeholders who assume the
leadership position or monitor professional managers.
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In Japan, the transition from family firm to managerially controlled firm was hastened in some
industries with the defeat of Japan in the WWII. The reforms of the Occupation Army severed
family ties in several large zaibatsu, which dissipated some of the more prominent owner
families. Yet, family bases were preserved for firms that had no obvious tie with military
activities during the World War II, or for firms that were small. Several pharmaceutical
companies are examples. Also there are several firms that grew after the World War II which
are still influenced by the founding families. Examples include Sony and Matsushita.
In modem Japan, especially during the post WWII period, family firms represented
backwardness and smallness, especially in the light of community logic in the business world
(Morikawa, 1996). The word dozoku-gaisha, which could be translated as "family firm," is often
used in a pejorative way. By limiting the shacho succession race to the family members, it is
believed, family firms do not attract the most career aspiring professional managers, or face
handicaps in boosting employee morale. Moreover, there have been quite a few incidents
where the shacho succession involved competition among siblings that' was quite destructive for
the family as well as for the firm.
One interesting aspect of the family firm in Japan is that founding families hold only a small
amount of shares in the firm over which they exert control. For example, the Takeda Science
Foundation owned 2.13% of total shares at Takeda Pharmaceutical in 1985, while one of the
Takeda family was with the firm as a shacho. It shows that the founding family is a special type
of shareholder, able to wield power beyond the basis of shareholding.
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Succession rules in family firms are different from succession rules in non-family firms.
Succession rules may indeed differ across family firms, reflecting the family dynamics as well
as the style and preference of individual families. First of all, family members are identified as
successors very early in their career and receive special training in preparation for future top
leadership. When there is more than one eligible family member, there may be a horse race
competition among family members. When the incumbent shacho in a family has only
daughters in the next generation, he may consider a son-in-law as his successor. As a result of
early identification, the age of a shacho who belongs to a founding family is often quite young
compared to that of non-family shacho. The young age of the shacho also results because it is a
succession from father to son, which involves a generational change that spans a thirty-year
age gap.
Second, professional managers may assume the position of shacho as an interim shacho. The role
of the interim shacho is to educate and prepare the next generation of the founding family
rather than to make substantial changes in corporate strategy. In this case, personal loyalty to
the founding family may be the important qualification for the professional manager to become
a shacho. In fact the practice of having an interim shacho is well established in Japanese
management history (Morikawa, 1996). As early as Tokugawa era, zaibatsu family such as
Mitsui and Sumitomo were famous for having talented and loyal head clerks (banto) who ran
the family estate. Despite the tradition, however, the shacho has more power than the head
clerk and may seek to remove the family from top management.
In short family members continue to have access to top executive positions among firms in
younger industries, for example, food and electronics industries, and in a traditional industry,
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such as the pharmaceutical industry where most of the firms could trace their history back to
pre-modern Japan. They also develop culture for family firms. They reward commitment and
loyalty toward the family. The imprinting of the founding experience seems important in
determining the nature of the family reign.
(4) Government
The Japanese government has actively intervened in selected industries with the goal of
producing firms that could compete successfully in the world market (Johnson, 1982). The role
of MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, has been especially large in non-
financial companies, although it is debatable exactly how much government was instrumental
in the phenomenal growth of Japan. Beside regulations, national subsidies, and tax policies,
which are commonly used by governments in other countries, the Japanese government has
unique ways to influence business: administrative guidance, and personnel flows from
government to financial and industrial firms.
The state has a long history in playing a special role in economic development in Japan since
the opening of the nation in 1867 (Hirschmeier & Yui, 1981). As is common in late-
industrializing societies, state bureaucrats with knowledge and managerial skill provided a
pool of scarce management talent. For example, Mitsubishi Mining started as a provincial
government project in 1866, until it was finally sold to bureaucrat-turned-businessman Iwasaki
Yataro, the founder of the Mitsubishi group. During war-time, the military government
intervened directly, coordinating production for the war-time economy.
72
The role of government in the postwar crisis following the Occupation period was rather
indirect because the role of government in the war-time economy was heavily criticized.
Instead, the government's role centered on funding through the Bank of Japan. The Bank of
Japan had been leading the loan consortium to allocate funds to key industries as part of the
Target Production Policy, although it gradually relinquished the role to private banks as early
as 1948. The Bank of Japan provided the role model for city banks to follow during the financial
crisis throughout the post World War 11 period (Okazaki, 1994).
Not all industries have an equally close relationship with the government bureaucracy in Japan
(Okimoto, 1989). Industries such as steel, petroleum refining, and the electrical power utilities
have been dependent on government support, while industries such as the fast-food industry
or the general trading companies have maintained quite distant relationships with the
government bureaucracy. The electronics industry is somewhere in the middle between
adhesion and arm's length autonomy. Although government bureaucracies rarely become a
major shareholder in industrial companies, they can support firms enormously through
lending and through controlling the legal environments within the industry. The
organizational identity for these firms could be thought of as that of public enterprise, as
opposed to private enterprise, even though they are traded in the major stock exchange.
Intervention by government has been maintained by the practice of government bureaucrats
seeking their second job at private firms after retiring from the government. The practice called
'amnakudari' (translated directly as "descent from heaven") made the government bureaucracy
the most attractive career for college graduates. Schaede (1995) argues that the old boy network
of government bureaucrats provides an important monitoring mechanism for Japanese
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corporate governance. However, the role of these amakudari directors seem to be limited to
channeling information, especially after Japanese government has taken various liberalization
policies. With the government having less means for controlling the industrial firms, the
influence pattern may go the other way around, in which the industrial firm tries to influence
government by providing employment opportunities for retiring bureaucrats.
Just like the main bank, government has a role as providing a source of organizational identity
and rules and a role as a dominant stakeholder. Table 3-6 shows the list of anakudari directors
from MITI to industrial firms. The office title of amakudari directors is an indicator of the
involvement of government bureaucracies in industry and in individual firms.
Conclusion
In this chapter I reviewed the institutional context of shacho succession in Japan, and the cases
in which particular stakeholders carry unusually significant weight in the shacho succession
pattern. Japanese firms shared both a stakeholder environment and an institutionalized
community conception of the firm. On the other hand, some firms have a distinctive pattem of
dominant stakeholders that shape the organizational identity and influence the pattern of
shacho succession.
The review of the Japanese corporate governance system through the lens of institutional
context and of donminant stakeholders does not give the complete picture of Japanese shacho
succession, however. In the U.S., a dominant set of stakeholders, the shareholders as
represented on the board, has at least in theory the power to force a shacho to retire. In Japan,
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only in a minority of firm is there a counterpart, in terms of a dominant stakeholder. Therefore
the puzzle of shacho succession in Japan remains. How is the problem of reluctant retirement
addressed in the Japanese context? The next chapter tries to answer the question by examining
succession rules for Japanese shacho through the stories of shacho succession in the popular
business press.
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Table 3-1. The comparison of corporate governance system: U.S. vs. Japan
U.S.- Market Governance Japan - Relational governance
Organizational model Property view of firm Community view of firm
Financial market Well developed security Weak financial market, strong
market main bank
Control characteristics Control based on equity Control based on loan, equity, &
personnel exchange
IArm's length Tight control
Table 3-2. The board of directors at Sumitomo Metal Industries in 1995.
Title Title in Japanese No. of Avg. Avg. tenure
directors age with the co.
(Outsider) (Excl. outsider)
Chairman* Kaicho 1 69 47
CEO & President* Shacho 1 65 40
Vice president * Fuku shacho 3 (1) 61 25.6 (36.5)
Senior executive director* Senmu 2 58.5 35.5
Managing executive Jomu 6 (1) 58.2 29.5 (34.6)
director
Director Torishimariyaku 16(2) 56.1 28.4 (32.1)
Full time auditor Joninkansayaku 2 57 33.5
Auditor Kansayaku 2(2) 74 1.5
Total 33 (6) 58.8 28.4 (32.8)
Source: Yuka Shoken Hokokusho.
*: directors with representative right.
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Table 3-3 Share Ownership of All Listed Firms by Type of Investors in Japan
T,:ype of shareholders Five Years Averag Percentage of Listed Shars
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92
Government 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.6
Financial Institutions 34.4 37.6 39.0 44.4 44.8
Banks n.a. n.a. 17.7 21.0 21.8
Investment Trusts 1.4 1.8 1.2 2.5 3.3
Annuity Trusts n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.9 1.0
Life Insurance 11.2 12.0 12.6 13.2 13.1
Other Insurance 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.3 4.0
Other Institutions 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.4 1.6
Business 25.6 26.3 26.0 24.6 24.7
Corporations
Securities Companies
Individuals & Others
Foreigners
Source: Kojima (1997).
1.4
35.2
3.2
1.6
31.9
2.4
1.8
27.7
5.2
2.3
23.5
4.4
1.5
23.4
5.0
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Table 3-4. Dispatched directors from main bank among publicly traded firms in Japan in 1993
(Total number of publicly held firms: 2240)
Top 10 Main Banks Capital Number of firms Number of
(Trillion) accepting-, dispatched directors
dispatched directors
Nihon Kogyo Bank 31.4 102 137
Daiichi Kangyo Bank 40.0 138 224
Tokyo Bank 16.2 41 48
Sakura Bank 39.8 118 170
Mitsubishi Bank 37.0 131 187
Fuji Bank 39.1 130 174
Sumitomo Bank 37.6 83 166,
Sanwa Bank 37.2 113 177
Tokai Bank 23.4 76 137
Asahi Bank 21.7 61 82
Source: Nihonnojinmyakuto kigyokeiretsu (1994).
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Table 3-5. Related firms in Toyota Motor group.
Industry
Automobile
Parts (Direct)
Part (Transaction
Partner)
Firm
Hino Motors
Daihatsu
Toyota Shatai
Kanto Automobile
Toyoda Automatic Loom
Aichi Seikou
Toyota Koki
Aishin Seiki
Nippon Deso
Toyota Spinning
Toyota Synthetic fiber
Tokai Rika Denki
Seisakusho
Aisan Industries
Chuo Hassu
Hutaba Indusries
Kyowa Leather
Trinity Industries
Koyo Seiko
Tokyo Shoketsu Metal
Chuo kaen Industries
Owari Seiki
Koito
Shiroki Industries
Kayaba Industries
Source: Nihonnno jinmyakuto kigyo keiretsu (1994, p. 149).
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% hold by Toyota
Motors
11%
15%
43%
48%
23%
21%
21%
21%
23%
9%
41%
30%
31%
23%
13%
33%
30%
21%
25%
5%
5%
19%
14%
9%
Table 3-6 Amakudari from MITI to industrial companies in 1993.
.0.000 004"*
(Table continues in the next page)
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lndustry
Oil
Electricity
Gas
Construction
Chemical
Steel/Metal
Machine
Electronics
Transportation
Executive Positions
Chairman
Shacho
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Vice president
Managing Dir.
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Vice President
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Director
Vice Chairman
Vice president
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Director
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Shacho
Vice president
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Director
Shacho
Vice president
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Director
Vice president
Firms
Showa Shell Oil*
Arabia Oil*
Teikoku Oil
Japan Energy
Chubu Electricity*, Chugoku Electricity*
Tohoku Electricity*, Okinawa Electricity*
Tokyo Electricity*, Hokkaido Electricity*
Osaka Gas*
Tokyo Gas, Toho Gas
Aoki Construction*
Tekken
Kajima, Kumadanigumi
Toda Construction
Nihon Sheet Glass*
Asahi Glass*
Showa Denko, Synthetic Rubber
Sumitomo Chemical
Nihon Sanso, Ube Kosan, Toho Chemical,
Takeda Pharmaceutical, Sumitomo Osaka
Cement
Kobe Steel*, Toho Aen*, Topure*
Kawasaki Steel*
Chugoku Industry*
NKK*, Sumitomo Metal*,
Daido Specialty Steel*, Kobe Steel
Kobe Steel
Japan Steel, Furukawa Denko, Fujikura
Toyo Engineer*, Kubota
Chiyoda Chemical Machinery
Komatsu
Tokimekku*
Mitsubishi Electronics*, Kanda
Communications
Matsushita*, Nippon Denso*, Hitachi, Sony
Toshiba, Fujitsu, Sharp, Kyocera, Ricoh
Oki Electronics
Suzuki*
--------- ----- 
-----------------
Machinery
Wholesale
Retail
Others
---- - --- UM ~k*A-- ---- ----
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Directors
Vice president
Senior Exec. Dir.
Managing Dir.
Vice president
Senior Exec. Dir.
Senior Exec. Dir
Managing Dir.
Director
Advisor
Auditor
Auditor
87 Companies
91 person 33 with representative rights (*).
Source: Nihonno jinmyakuto kigyokeiretsu (1994, p. 23).
*: Director with representative rights
*: number of directors in the parenthesis
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Mitsui Shipbuilding*, Nissan, Hino
Mitsubishi Auto, Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
Fuji Heavy Industries
Suzuki
Itochu*
Marubeni*, Tomen*, Mitsubishi Shoji*,
Iwatani Sangyo
Mitsui Bussan*, Nissho Iwai
Nichii
Seiyu*, Nagasakiya, Daiei, Izumiya
(1)**
(2)**
(1)**
(3)**
(3)**
(3)**
Total
Chapter 4. Rules of shacho succession in managerial firms
Organizational rules mirror the identities of organizations, providing guiding principles for
everyday decisions. Organizational rules can be thought of as providing guidance in specific
situations, in our case the situation of shacho succession. Each firm may develop scripts or
'theories' of shacho succession -that is, theories for selecting the best person - based on
institutional logics and also based on organizational history. These 'theories' of succession are
likely to share many of common elements as they are influenced by the institutional logic. Yet,
these 'theories' of succession are likely to have idiosyncrasies, because they are shaped by the
unique history of the firm. Succession rules reflect the 'theories' held by actors in organizational
fields.
Linguistic framing is important in providing legitimacy for the succession rules (Hirsch, 1986),
especially if the linguistic framing is grounded in popular culture. Linguistic framing can be
especially useful when some of the actors break the rule. Breaking the rule is only natural, if we
admit the human agency in the decision making process. When faced with rule-breaking
behavior, both actors and observers try to make sense of the deviant behavior. The guiding
principles of shacho succession provide a basis for evaluating these unusual shacho events.
Deviant behaviors that are consistent with the guiding principle are less threatening than those
deviant behaviors that directly go against the principles. Through the linguistic framing of these
unusual successions, values are imposed on these deviant behaviors, which may help to
strengthen the dominant institutional'logic, or to give legitimacy to an emerging institutional
logic.
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In order to identify organizational rules of top executive succession, I examine the popular
business journal articles on shacho succession published in Keizaikai between 1982 and 1991.
There are two by-weekly business journals that provide extensive coverage on Japanese top
management: Keizaikai and Zaikai (both could be translated as 'business world'). These journals
are known not for their analytical power, but for the intimate details of shacho succession
obtained either through interviews with principal actors themselves or through the
'anonymous' industry experts who provide the reporters with details of shacho succession.
Although they may not be the best source to get insights on the Japanese economy in general,
they are a good source for an outsider to learn about intricacies of shacho succession. I would
also argue that these articles reflect the past practices of shacho succession in the organizational
field, if not the current or future practices.
In the first section, I review the succession rules for Japanese shacho in four aspects: community
identity and the guiding principles of shacho succession; procedural rules on succession; tenure
rules; and two competing rhetorics of succession (rules on why there should be a succession or
no-succession). Then, I examine some unusual successions -that is, shacho successions that
break the prevalent rules -and see how they are framed in the press.
Succession rules and Succession-as-usual
Succession-as-usual reflects the existence of institutional rules of shacho succession. A succession
in one firm is perceived as usual because it has followed the infonnal rules of shacho succession
dominant in the organizational field. These informal rules specify who initiates the succession
process, who the candidates will be, why succession occurs, and when succession occurs.
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(1) Community identity and guiding principles of shacho succession
As discussed in Chapter 2, the logic of community provide- an important source for
organizational identity among large Japanese firms. The most important principle in shacho
succession, as it is in any leadership succession, is to find the best person so that the
organization will preserve its organizational identity and continue to prosper under the new
leadership. The mandates of finding the best candidate and preparing him for the top position
are the two most important things that the board of directors and the shacho have in mind when
they initiate the shacho succession process. In fact, a Japanese shacho is evaluated for his ability to
designate the best successor, which is revealed in the following comment.
"A top manager is evaluated by the selection of his successor. For example, Mr. Ikeda,
the adviser and the former shacho of Mitsui Bussan, used to have a low approval rate
both within the firm as well as among business circles while he worked as a shacho.
However, he has been reevaluated afterward because he has chosen such a brilliant
successor, Mr. Yahiro, who did a wonderful job. (Keizaikai, 1985. 1.22)"
In addition to the need to find the best successor, there is an additional guiding principle in
Japanese shacho succession -to rejuvenate the firm. The term 'wakagaeri' (rejuvenation) is used
again and again in describing most shacho succession. A Japanese management team, as well as
the whole organization, is susceptible to aging because of the seniority principle and the
abhorrence of laying off employees without very good reason. Shacho succession is an effective
way to deal with the aging of the work place, because the vertical nature of Japanese social life
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makes it difficult for senior employees to stay when their subordinates assume higher positions
in the organizational hierarchy. Thus, shacho change usually brings a string of promotions in the
lower levels of the hierarchy and a sizable turnover in the higher levels, both voluntary and
involuntary. Although there is really no reason why there shouldn't be continuous rejuvenation
at other levels of hierarchy without shacho change, the lack of shacho turnover is often correlated
with the large population of senior executives in Japanese firms.
Retirement is often framed as 'cherry blossom' in Japanese society, which emphasizes the virtue
of early retirement. The image of sakura (cherry tree/cherry blossom) is often used to describe
the last exit of the leader. The Japanese have a great fondness for the cherry tree. Each year, the
entire country is captivated by the northward progress of the blooming of the trees -the so-
called "cherry blossom front." Japanese love sakura not just for its beautiful flower, but also for
its enchanting way the petals scatter in the wind. The scattering of cherry blossom provides a
powerful image for Japanese to end their career without any lingering.
"Japanese love the cherry blossom for its splendid scattering. As such, great leaders in
Japan share the common character of exiting/resigning a bit early, with the regret of
those who follow them. (Keizaikai, 1985.1.22, p.48)"
(2) The procedural rules of shacho succession
One of the most important elements of the 'normal' shacho succession is that the shacho, not the
directors or the chairman of the board, initiates the succession process. The chairman of the
board, who is usually the retired shacho in the same company, plays an important advisory role
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in the succession process. The rather passive role of the chairman in the shacho change process is
expressed in the term 'inkyo' (retirement from active life) which is used to describe the handover
of the household head position from father to son. Once the father hands over the power to his
son - that is, once he publicly announces his retirement (inkyo) - his role within the family is
dramatically diminished, despite the fact that he is still living with the same family. Similarly,
when a retiring shacho was questioned whether he would continue to be active in management
decision making as chairman of the board, he answered, "No. Not at all. Japanese have a well-
established retirement (inkyo) system for the chairman. I would of course give advice if the new
shacho seeks one, but he (the new shacho) is now the head of the company. (Keizaikai, 1982.10.12)"
Yet, as the mentor of the incumbent shacho, the chairman is consulted on several key aspects of
shacho succession, such as the timing of the change as well as the selection of the new shaciw.
Second, as mentioned already, another important procedural aspect of 'usual' shacho succession
is that the outgoing shacho assumes the position of the chairman of the board on his retirement.
Although he gives up the power of organizational decision making, he is still respected as the
symbolic leader of the community until his successor decides to step up for his own retirement.
The two-step process of retirement makes the incumbent shacho less reluctant in his retirement
decision, especially when compared to a CEO in the U.S. who has to give up everything as he
steps down from the top position.
The retirement of the shacho to become chairman is not automatic, however, and is contingent
on many factors. For example, if the retiring shacho has done a bad job in his reign, he loses his
legitimacy as symbolic leader of the firm. The existence of a powerful chairman who resist
stepping down may also obstruct the 'normal' promotion of the shacho. In either cases, shacho
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may retire into positions other than chairman, such as advisor (sodanyaku), or vice chairman,
usually without representative rights.
Third, it is considered a usual shacho succession if the successor is an insider who has spent
most of his career within the company. Often called haenuki (native born, born and bred) or
puropa (professional manager), the insider shacho proves that a firm is capable of training its
own leader, unlike some of the less prestigious firms which have to rely on external sources for
their top management talent. The rule of insider succession is taken for granted once it is
established within the firm. When insider succession has not been the rule, insider succession is
expected to boost employee morale. In a society where the employees have limited opportunity
for moving across firms, filing the position of shacho with an insider has a practical benefit of
motivating employees across all levels of the hierarchy by signaling that they might also reach
the top position someday.
Being an insider is not enough to make the shacho succession a usual one, however. To minimize
the chance of losing top executives to other firms, Japanese firms tend not to designate the heir
apparent. A horse race is the preferred mode, which is also reflected in the epithets accrued to
the candidates, such as 'honmei (the favorite)' and 'taikouba (the rivals).' The race usually
involves the two top ranks-vice president ('fukushacho') and senior executive manager
('senmu') -within the top management team. Firms may vary in the number of vice presidents
(fukushacho) or senior executive managers (senmu), but these two classes of top executives
' The hierarchical structure of top management is shown in Table 3-2 which shows the list or top
executives at Sumitomo Metal Industries in 19% as it appears in Yukashoken hokokusho, the Japanese
equivalent of proxy statement. Most firms adopt the same titles for their top executives. Again, it reveals
the highly institutionalized nature of Japanese business.
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usually share the representative rights with the shacho and kaicho, signaling their status as
candidates for the next shacho race. It is within these two classes of top executives that business
journals will identify the favorite candidate ('honmei') and his rivals ('taikouba'). When the new
shacho comes from outside of these two ranks, it is considered 'unusual' even when he is also an
insider. I will discuss these unusual cases in a later section.
(3) The tenure rules
A closer look at shacho change reveals the Japanese firms' reliance on various tenure rules.
There are three types of tenure rules that are followed by many Japanese firms: the 2-year unit
term rule, tenure-limit rule, and retirement age rule. Shacho succession is considered 'normal'
when it follows the tenure rules within the organization. First, Japanese firms have a two-year
unit term, which is called '1,' for their shacho. Thus, the tenure of a shacho is often described as
two-term-four-year ('2-ki-4-year'), meaning that the shacho has served for two 2-year terms,
making four years in total. It is a norm that shacho change occurs at the end of the 2-year term,
not in the middle of the term.
Second, another informal tenure rule is to have a pre-determined tenure limit for the office of
shacho. Some Japanese firms are known for having these informal rules. For example, Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries and Japan Steel had a 4-year tenure rule, while Hitachi had a 10-year tenure
rule. These tenure rules were referred to as 'internal rules' (naiki in Japanese)' or 'unwritten
rules' (hubunritsu in Japanese). [A vignette of shacho succession at Japan Steel is included at the
end of the chapter as Appendix 4-1.] Tenure rules may vary across firms, yet Itami (1995) and
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Miyajima (1996) both report that the tenure rules of two-term-four-years and three-term-six-
years have become increasingly popular among large firms in recent years.
Third, the most popular tenure rule is to retire shortly before the retirement age, although few
firms have an explicit mandatory retirement policy for the shacho. The age of seventy, which is
given a special term, koki 2, is a socially accepted retirement age that is widely shared among
Japanese firms. For example, the shacho and founder of Suzuki Motors, Mr. Suzuki, retired in
1957 without assuming any positions in the company. The explanation for his retirement was
that he became koki. Koki is also celebrated among Japanese scholars with a commemorative
publication that is a collection of writings by their disciples in the field (a "festscnft").
Just like tenure limit rules, the retirement age rule creates an implicit limit for the shacho's
tenure. When a firm does not have an internal rule on the desired tenure for its shacho, the
retiring shacho may impose a limit by selecting a successor who is in the 'right' age band (Vancil,
1987). When the firm has an internal rule on the desired tenure for shacho, it would be important
information to know who is considered as a candidate and who is not.
In addition to these organizational rules of tenure, it is also considered 'usual' to have shacho
change at special historical moments, such the as 50th, 60th, or 100th anniversary of the firm's
founding. The start of the new decade-more often the new decade in the Japanese reign-year
system rather than the new decade in the Western calendar-also provided a timing marker for
shacho change to occur.
2 Teterm told comes from a Chinese poem my Tu Fu, which sings "It Is quite an achievement to become
70. Why don't we hope for 70?" In referring to his own life, Confucius also had something to say about
age 70: "at seventy I could indulge my beart's desire without overstepping the rules."
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(4) The best time to retire: the rhetoric of hanamichi vs. insekijinin
If all the shacho successions in Japan occurred only by the tenure rules identified above, we
would see complete decoupling of succession from performance and other criteria. Yet,
researchers have found that Japanese top executive successions are related to performance
(Kaplan, 1994; Miyajima, 1996). The coupling suggests that there is another logic of shacho
succession that works together with tenure rules to guide shacho succession in Japan. There are
two quite distinctive 'theories' of retirement in Japan: the shacho retires when he has done a
terrible job; the shacho retires when he has done a terrific job. The former is called insekijinin
('retiring in order to take responsibility'), and the latter is called hanamichi ('flower passage').
The rhetoric of insekijinin is easier to understand from resource dependence theory. Shacho
change is a time for readjustment with the changing external environments, facilitated by
powerful stakeholders who may voice their concern through various channels. It is hard to
deny the influence of powerful stakeholders, especially the main bank, but quite a few
insekijinin result from a shacho's own judgment that he is not suited for solving the
organizational problem.
Performance is only one of the reasons, and sometimes the least significant reason, for
retirement as part of taking responsibility. Insekijinin is reserved for colorful failures. They range
from financial crises -such as failure to pay the dividend, or losing market share to a rival,
especially when it involves a change of ranking within the industry, such as Sapporo Brewery
90
losing its second place to Asahi Brewery -to non-financial crises, including accidents, conflict
between labor and management, and even downsizing.
The rhetoric of hanamichi is quite unique in Japan as it encourages a shacho to consider stepping
down (or stepping up) when he is doing a good job. The word hanamichi originated in Japanese
Kabuki theatre. It is a runway that passes from the rear of the theatre to stage right at the level
of the spectators' heads. The entry on kabuki in the Encyclopedia Britannica has the following
description: "An integral part of the Kabuki drama since the 18th century, it is used for climactic
scenes - spectacular entries, exits, processions, and battles - and for scenes when intimacy and
emotional rapport with the audience are desired. The name hanamichi suggests that it was once
used to present flowers and gifts to the actors." Hanamichi as the ideal form of retirement is also
shown in another Japanese word, which always accompanies hanamich, yutai (the
brave/honorary retirement). The term yutai is often used in the military when a commander
steps down voluntarily to make way for a younger colleague. Yutai is applauded because it
leads to the rejuvenation of the community and the firm. Together, the rhetoric of hanamichi,
yutai and wakagaeri recapitulate the logic of community in which leadership change is a time for
celebrating the shared identity as a community -the benevolent leader making way for his
younger successor, which will prepare the community for prosperity in the future as a result of
rejuvenation.
To make the shacho succession even more spectacular, a shacho may schedule his exit so that he
has some visible achievements of which to boast. The achievements that make a shacho's exit
hanamichi are not confined to performance measures, such as return on investment or stock
price, although the a dividend payout is one of the more frequently referred conditions for
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hanamichi. Other achievements include launching a new business, such as Mr. Yamazaki at
Mazuda launching a new business in the U.S. market in 1985, or presiding over well-recognized
national or global conventions, such as Mr. Tamaru at Dentsu presiding over the World
Advertising Convention in 1985.
It is hard to say that good performance alone will be the predictor of shacho succession,
especially when we think of various tenure rules established among Japanese firms. It is more
appropriate to say that giver limited tenure, a shacho will try to make his exit as festive as
possible. When a great achievement coincides with the some of the tenure rules within the
organization, journalists in Japanese media naturally expect a shacho change. It is another
instance of a usual shacho change. In this way the normal and usual shacho change becomes a
splendid shacho change.
The rhetoric of hanamichi is powerful because it is the key to becoming a chairman with real
power (jitsuryoku kaicho) within the firm (Toyokeizai, 1971) and to have a say in the Zaikai, which
could be translated as either "financial circles" or "business world"3. The four major business
federations in Japan are Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), Nissho (Japan
Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employer's Assocation),
and Keizai Doyukai (Japan Committee for Economic Development). The appointment to the
chairman position or to one of the few vice chairman positions in these federations largely
reflects the status of firms within an industry as well as the status of industry within the
3 Tanaka (1979) argues that both "financial circle" or "business world" is not an adequate translation of
Zaikai. Instead, he defines Zaikai as that "group of people who, apart from their identification with
specific companies or industries, speak from the capitalist position and exert a strong influence on politics
(Tanaka, 1979, p.64)."
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national economy. For example, the chairman of Keidanren usually comes from Japan Steel, the
biggest company in the steel industry. Employees of Japan Steel usually express their pride in
working in the steel industry, as they believe that steel is the most important industry in the
national economic system. To give another example, one of the vice chairman positions goes to
a representative ofthe electronics industry. Within electronics, it is also customary that the
chairman from either Hitachi or Toshiba, the top two electronics company, will fill the position.
In other words, the appointment of top leadership in the business world reflects the pecking
order within the industry as well as that in the whole national economic system. If a shacho does
exceptionally well and if his charisma is acknowledged by his fellow business elites, he has a
chance to be active in the business federation, which is a big honor for him as an individual as
well as for the firm he belongs to.
The other side of hanamichi is that a shacho may use the rhetoric to prolong his tenure when the
firm is in trouble. For example, Mr. Takeda continued his shacho position into a third term,
against the two-term-four-year hubunritzu (unwritten rule), because of the 'unusual'
performance crisis in mid-1980s. Shacho Kawai at Komatsu is also an example. In 1982, shacho
Mr. Kawai retired to the post of chairman. In an interview with Keizaikai, Mr. Kawai said, "I
intended to stay on as shacho for 7-8 years when I was first appointed. Because of the unforeseen
crisis-the Nixon shock and the two oil shocks -however, I ended up staying for 18 years.
With the completion of the full line operation of construction machines and with the
establishment of the foreign sales network, I decided to retire as chairman (kai cho). ... From now
on, I'll play the role of an adviser." The article added that the good performance of Komatsu
amidst the depression in the construction machine industry also helped him make his
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retirement decision (Keizaikai, 1982.10.12, P.27).
Succession-to-one's-surprise
There are two types of rule-breaking, positive and negative, if the rules identified above provide
a reference point. A positive rule-breaking would be the one that is consistent with the logic of
community. A negative rule-breaking would be one that goes against the logic of community
or is unclear in nature.
(1) Positive rule-breaking
The first type of rule breaking includes voluntary retirement of a shacho long before he reaches
retirement age or the tenure limit rule, if the firm has one. Mr. Tokusue at Teijin provides an
example. Mr. Tokusue surprised the media twice with his decision to retire as shacho in 1983
after serving only three years in the position and again with his decision to retire as chairman in
1985 after only two years. The media praised his action as 'refreshing (sawayaka)'. Ironically,
what he was trying to convey through his rule-breaking behavior, both against the dominant
institutional rules which expect four to six years of shacho tenure and against the organizational
rule of unlimited tenure (set by his predecessor Mr. Oya who stayed in the shacho position for 24
years before his death), was his resolution to set a new rule of early retirement of shacho around
age 65. Mr. Tokusue learned from first-hand experience how hard it is to remove a long-tenured
shacho, such as his predecessor Mr. Oya, absent rules and other control mechanisms. By
showing his willingness to abide by his resolution, Mr. Tokusue successfully established a rule
that is more likely to be observed by his successors. And indeed, the successors Mr. Okamoto
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and Mr. Itagaki faithfully followed Mr. Tokusue's lead. Some other examples of short-tenured
shacho include Mr. Kumazawa at Oji, Mr. Sakaguchi at Unitica, and Mr. Nakayama at Nippon
Kogyou Bank.
Another example of positive rule-breaking is to pick the successor from a lower rank of the
management hierarchy. As mentioned above, the dominant rule is to select -. successor from the
top two classes under the shacho-vice president and senior managing directors. To select from
a lower level is called 'batteki jinji (pick out promotion)' and business journals often count the
number of senior executives that the new younger shacho has moved ahead of. For example,
when Mr. Idei was picked as shacho at Sony in 1995, it received media attention for its
progressiveness in promoting such a lower rank executive, 15th in the top management
hierarchy, to the top. It should be noted that 'progressiveness' comes not only from designating
the younger executive but also from ignoring the norm of promoting the favorite candidate into
the position of either vice president or senior executive director and then to shacho. Given the
aging of top executives in Japanese firms, such progressive rule-breaking is often applauded in
the press.
(2) Negative rule-breaking
Succession rules may be broken against the guiding principles of the logic of kaisha. Such rule
breaking behaviors receive public attention. Organizational actors who are in the focus of such
attention are pressured to give explanations. Often they would voluntarily invite the media for
a press conference or for a private interview. I examine three kinds of shacho succession that
break the 'usual' succession rules described above.
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First, there are a few shachos who had a very long tenure beyond the implicit retirement age in
the business world. The Japanese corporate governance system, which relies largely on a shared
code of conduct among the business elite, is quite vulnerable to strong-willed shachos who insist
on staying for a long time, ignoring the code of conduct. These shachos are often quite unusual
leaders whose charisma has been invaluable for the growth of the firm. Some of the examples of
these long-tenure shachos are Mr. Oya at Teijin who served for 24 years as shacho, Mr. Miyazaki
at Asahi Chemical who served for 24 years, Mr. Kawai at Komatsu who served for 18 years, Mr.
Yamamoto at Kubota who also served for 17 years, and Mr. Kawamata at Nissan who served
for 16 years as shacho.
Note that each long-tenured shacho listed above has no ties with a founding family. They are the
professional managers who arrived at the top of the organizational hierarchy rather early in
their career due to exceptional ability as a manager. Their legitimacy within the firm and in the
business world is often captured in the epithet attached to those names, 'the Father who revived
the firm.' In other words, their charisma has transformed their power and legitimacy into that of
the founder, and even the main bank may find it hard to challenge them unless the firm is about
to go bankrupt.
Although the business journals do not criticize these shacho simply for their long tenure, they
nevertheless regularly report the succession race in these firms, such as who are the likely
candidates and whether there will be a change at the end of the current ki (term), regardless of
the shacho's own thought on the issue. Some business journalists, such as the chief editor at the
by-weekly magazine Keizaikai, often visit these long-tenured shacho, giving frank but unwanted
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advice on succession planning. They report such visits and the interviews in detail, often
contrasting these long-tenured shacho with other charismatic leaders who refused the
temptation to stay too long. For example, Mr. Saito, the chief editor of Keizaikai magazine,
compares Mr. Kawamata at Nissan with one of Mr. Kawamata's contemporaries, Mr.
Nakayama at Nippon Kogyo Bank, in one of his articles that pushes Mr. Kawamata to retire as
follows:
"The secret of the power of Mr. Nakayama, who is only a ronin ('masterless samurai'
which indicate that the person does not have any formal position), is the fact that he
resigned Nippon Kogyo Bank at the age of 62 when he could have stayed much longer
as the head of the bank. (Keizaikai, 1985.1.8, p.26 )1
Again, it is hard to say that Mr. Nakayama remained influential only because he retired early,
especially given his achievement during the 1970s. Yet, the above statement makes it clear what
kind of behavior is more valued and respected within the business circle.
Another type of rule-breaking behaviors that are framed negatively by business press is the
dismissal of shacho by the powerful chairman. This is closely related to the first type of rule-
breaking behaviors since it is usually those long-tenured shacho who become the powerful
chairman and reign over their own successor shacho. They are called 'jitsuryoku kaicho (chairman
with real power).' One of the reasons why the current study focus on shacho instead of chairman
is the institutionalized rule that chairman does not hold the power to make personnel decision
against the will of shacho.
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Although there are quite a few powerful chairmen actively involved in strategic decisions
especially during the first few years of transition, there are only a handful of chairmen who
actually dismiss their own successors, partly because the dismissal of the shacho is an
acknowledgement of their own lack of foresight. It is also true that if the successor does happen
to be a disappointment to everybody, both organizational members and stakeholders expect the
chairman to correct the mistake. The correction takes several forms depending on economic and
political factors, such as how badly the shacho has been performing, or how powerful the
chairman is, etc. The most gentleman-like behavior for the chairman is to allow the current
shacho to step up as a chairman by retiring into a position of advisory role. If the chairman is
recognized as representing the firm, he may still stay as a chairman while putting his successor
into another position such as a vice chairman or advisor.
Finally, on a very rare occasion, shacho succession could occur as a result of a coup d'etat by top
executives who are hierarchically lower than the shacho. Such an incident happened in 1982 at
Mitsukoshi Department store, which received extensive publicity within the Japanese business
community. Gerlach provides a good summary of the "Mitsukoshi Incident" in his book that
looks at the role of horizontal keiretsu in Japan (Gerlach, 1992, p.111-113). This is an unusual
shacho succession drama that involves many actors playing a variety of roles in the removal of
the shacho. The general outline is that the shacho behaved dishonorably and nearly ruined the
firm, and he refused to step aside. A "mutiny" instigated by keiretsu board members and '
managers was required to remove him.
Although Gerlach introduces this case to illustrate how horizontal keiretsu membership could
affect the shacho succession in Japan, this is a very unusual case in many senses. First firms in
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the horizontal keiretsu usually do not intervene in each other's shacho succession process. A
shacho may solicit opinions on the quality of candidates, but as shacho Okada put it, the
intervention by a representative of another firm was "meddling in affairs that were none of his
business." Second, the overthrowing of the superior by the inferiors4 is also unthinkable in most
Japanese organizations. It is almost criminal when such acts are done publicly. The way the
incident finally resolved shows how unthinkable the coup d'etat is in Japan. All the directors
who staged the coup d'etat were also fired after the incident, except for the vice president Mr.
Ichihara, the only person against the coup d'etat. Mr. Ichihara became the next shacho,
supported by Mr. Koyama from Mitsui Bank.
In fact, it is not entirely true that the Mitsukoshi incident was viewed negatively. The
subordinates clearly acted out of their loyalty for the community, if not for their immediate
superiors. They may have even known that they were giving up prospects for further
promotion, which is hard to explain without knowing what the company means to these top
executives.
Conclusion
I have identified the succession rules for shacho by analyzing the shacho succession stories
appearing in the popular Japanese press. The linguistic framing of shacho succession shows that
'community' comes before the individual shacho in most firms. The succession is celebrated as a
rejuvenation for the organization and as a time to receive all the credit from the employee and
also from the business world for the individual shacho. The elaborate application of tenure rules
4 The term gekokujo (overthrowing of the superior by the inferiors) carries a moral element that such act is wrong.
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make the shacho succession more or less predictable in terms of timing. But, one could never be
sure about the new shacho because it is totally up to the shacho to decide his own successor.
Relative certainty in the timing of the change combined with the uncertainty in the identity of
the new shacho makes the review of possible shacho candidates an everyday business of the
Japanese business press.
Organizational actors do not always follow the rhetoric and institutional logics, however. They
often change the rules or use different logic and rules for their own advantage or for the benefit
of the firm. The active agency of shacho and of other organizational actors urges us to study to
what extent these various rules and rhetoric affect the actual shacho succession process and
outcome. In the following chapter, I take one of the succession rules - the tenure rule- and
examine how the rule affected the actual shacho succession process in Japan.
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Appendix 4-1: Shacho succession at Japan Steel
The history of Japan Steel runs back to 1857 when Oshima Takato set up the first westernized
blast furnace at Kamaishi Kozan in Iwate-ken. The demand for steel increased dramatically
during the Russo-Japanese war, and Yawata Steel was established as a state-operated enterprise
in 1901. The Great Depression after World War I was a painful period for most steel makers in
Japan, and Yawata and 5 other steel companies merged to form Japan Steel in 1934. At the time
of the merger, Japan Steel dominated the steel market with a market share of 96% for pig iron.
When the World War II ended, however, Japan Steel became the target of the anti-monopoly
policy. Under the guidance of GHQ Japan Steel was divided into 4 separate entities -Yawata
Steel, Fuji Steel, a shipping division (Nittetsu Kisen), and a brickyard manufacturing division -
and restarted as private enterprises. In order to strengthen global competitiveness, Yawata Steel
and Fuji Steel decided to merge in 1968. The merger announcement received wide support from
government and business circles. The merger was finally achieved in March 1970, and the name
was changed to Japan Steel (Shin-Nippon-Seitetsu, the New Japan Steel).
Japan Steel is one of the largest companies in Japan, yet it does not belong to six keiretsu
groupings. Table 4-1 shows the ownership structure of Japan Steel. Unlike Nippon Flour Mills,
in which Mitsui group firms dominates the top 10 shareholder list, Japan Steel is owned by
financial institutions of various keiretsu groupings. By having all major keiretsu firms as a major
shareholders, Japan Steel achieves independence from any of these shareholders. Moreover, the
top 10 shareholders own only 20% of the total shares. Also, there is a remarkable similarity in
the top 10 shareholders list at Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel in.1963, which also gives a clue to the
successful merger between the two companies. Although Japan Steel does not have cross-
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shareholding arrangements like other keiretsu member firms, it still enjoys the stability of shared
ownership. The composition of its top shareholders in 1973 and in 1983 remains almost the
same.
The shacho profile of Japan Steel is shown in Figure 4-1. The dividing line in the year 1970
indicates the merger between Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel. The information on their
organizational basis - i.e. whether they have been with Yawata or with Fuji before the merger -
is kept next to the name of each shacho.
Although the shacho change pattern at Japan Steel is similar to other large firms in some major
aspects - the dominance of the insider, the orderly progression through rank hierarchy, and the
old age of shacho at the time of appointment-it also reveals additional dimensions of the shacho
change process that is quite unique in merged companies. First of all, there is a friendly
exchange of the shacho position between top executives from Yawata Steel and those from Fuji
Steel. For example, Mr. Hirai, the first shacho after the merger, was from Yawata Steel, while his
successor Mr. Tazaka came from Fuji Steel. The shacho change showed the take-turn pattern
throughout 1980s and 1990s, from Mr. Saito (from Yawata), to Mr. Takeda (from Fuji), to Mr.
Saito (from Yawata), and finally to Mr. Imai (from Fuji). Such a pattern of taking turns is called
tasukigake (suspender style promotion) in Japanese. Tasukigake is a common solution for shacho
change whenever there is a merger between firms with equal status. A similar arrangement is
also found at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries after the merger of three firms in 1964, as well as at
Unitika after the merger between Nichibo and Nippon Rayon in 1969.
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Tasukigake reflects the nature of mergers in Japanese business. A merger takes place on friendly
terms and the interests of employees group are discussed quite explicitly in the process of the
merger. Merger deals frequently fall apart if one of the firms has doubt on protecting the
interests of its employees after the merger. There is a historical legacy for such friendly mergers
in Japan, however. Quite a few merger incidents took place among firms that were artificially
dissolved by GHQ during the Occupation period. Thus, many employees, especially at the top
level, had known each other as colleagues before the dissolution. It is much easier to cooperate
with one's own brother than with a complete stranger. At the same time, firm-based factions are
recognized as legitimate internal factions even after the merger.
The rhetoric of tasukigake is not free of criticism, however. The criticism is often made that
tasukigake style promotion could dampen organizational effectiveness, because it pays too much
attention to fairness among different factions, rather than individual merit in personnel
decisions. Despite the criticism, tasukigake is used quite frequently in the merged firms.
When internal factions are identified and are recognized as legitimate, firms may be more
conspicuous in resolving the fairness issue among different internal factions. In firms after the
friendly merger, such effort to ensure fair promotion opportunity is often achieved by
establishing an explicit tenure limit rule. For example, Japan Steel has established a 2-term-4-
year rule. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries also has established a 2-term-4-year tenure rule after the
merger. Although such a rule is still considered informal (hubunritsu, unwritten rule), it often
becomes public knowledge that both employees and business media expects the shacho to
change whenever the incumbent shacho has reached the expected term limit.
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The retirement age rule for directors in general or for specific titles can result in an effort to
control the traffic at the top. For example, Japan Steel has a 65 year age-limit rule forfuku-shacho.
The age-limit rule for top executives became popular as the age of directors grew older. Thus,
the incumbent shacho may have to take into account the age of his favorite candidate when
deciding the timing of his own retirement.
Another interesting aspect of shacho change found at Japan Steel is that it reveals another aspect
to the hanamichi rhetoric: the shacho may use it to prolong his tenure when the firm is in trouble,
so as not to bequeath a troubled situation to his successor. For example, Mr. Takeda continued
his shacho position into a third term, against the two-term-four-year hubunritzu, because of the
unusual performance crisis in the mid-1980s.
Finally, shacho change may be influenced by the external career of the chairman as well. In the
case of Japan Steel, shacho Takeda excused himself for going one more term to give a chance for
Chairman Saito to be elected as the chairman for Keidanren. To apply for the Chair of
Keidanren, one has to be the current chairman of a major company. As one executive in the Steel
industry has put it, "Japan Steel is very proud of being in the Steel industry. It is often said that
'Steel is the basis of a nation' among Japan Steel employees. Based on such pride, it is very
likely that the firm [and shacho Takeda] will do its best to support Chairman Saito to be elected
as the chair of Keidanren, as a zaikaisosai (the leader of the business in Japan). Several steel
industry experts have predicted that shacho Takeda will remain for another term in order to
support Chairman Saito for the chair position of Keidanren. (Keizaikai, 1985.4.9.) Such career
for the shacho and the Chairman is often reserved-for the biggest and the largest firms in Japan,
and may not be relevant for the smaller firms, though.
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Table 4-1. Top 10 shareholders at Japan Steel in 1963, 1973, and 1983
1963
Yawata Steel %
Kogyo Bank 2.68
Fuji Bank 2.14
Mitsubishi 1.88
Trust
Tokyo Marine 1.86
Sanwa Bank 1.78
Sumitomo 1.78
Bank
Mitsui Trust 1.67
Mitsubishi 1.64
Bank
Toyo Trust 1.59
Sumitomo 1.25
Trust
Sum 18.3
Fuji Steel
Kogyo Bank
Toyo Trust
Mitsui Trust
Sanwa Bank
Fuji Bank
Kobe Bank
Sumitomo
Bank
Tokai Bank
Mitsubishi
Trust
Mitsubishi
Bank
Sum
2.69
2.07
2.04
1.93
1.91
1.91
1.91
1.80
1.76
1.72
19.7
'V
1973 1983
0 ............0...... ..... 0 . ... . 0 * *Ji*........ * a...... .* ........ 0 0...........0 04.................
Japan Steel
Nihon Kogyo
Bank
Nihon Life
Daiichi Life
Meiji Life
Fuji Bank
Sumitomo Bank
Sanwa Bank
Tokyo Marine &
Fire
Daiichi Kangyo
Bank
Mitsubishi Bank
Sum
% Japan Steel
2.99 Nihon Kogyo
Bank
2.53 Nihon Life
1.87 Meiji Life
1.85 Daiichi Life
1.85 Fuji Bank
1.72 Sumitomo Bank
1.69 Sanwa Bank
1.67 Tokyo Marine &
Fire
1.59 Daiichi Kangyo
Bank
1.49 Mitsubishi Bank
19.3 Sum
Source: Keiretsuno Kenkyu (1965, 1975, and 1985).
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Figure 4-1. Shacho change profile of Japan Steel
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Chapter 5. The role of tenure rules and tenure milestone in shacho succession
In this chapter, I take on a large sample longitudinal study to test the implication of one of the
succession rules - the tenure rules - identified in Chapter 4. Drawing on analogies from the
political arena, I first review three types of tenure rules -the unit term rule, the tenure limit
rule, and the retirement rule -for shacho and discuss their functions in regulating the timing of
executive exit. In Section 2, 1 introduce the concept of 'tenure milestone' where the
predecessor's tenure works as an informal rule for shacho's tenure decision. Focusing on the role
of tenure precedents, I discuss how precedents may bd either strengthened or ignored, and how'
shacho performance may interact with this evolution of tenure rules. Section 2 concludes with a
set of empirical hypotheses based on the observations and discussion.
The main objective of the chapter is a systematic, empirical analysis of shacho tenure, or how
long a shacho serve, in the top 200 manufacturing corporations in Japan. Section 3 discusses the
data and the empirical methodology. The data set is a collection of tenure and other personal
information of shacho from yukashoken hokokusho (the Japanese counterpart to 10K reports and
proxy statements in the U.S.) supplemented by corporate information from various sources.
Event history analysis is employed to systematically analyze the data and test the hypotheses.
Section 4 presents and discusses the results, to be followed by a brief conclusion in Section 5.
1. Tenure rules for shacho
Whyr corporations need tenure rules for shacho
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Tenure rules refer to a set of organizational decision rules, formal or informal, that regulate
temporal aspects of personnel change. Tenure rules for the shacho help firms achieve a smooth
transition at the top. Organizational rules have often taken on an unfortunate negative
connotation, reminding people of bureaucratic red tape, but establishment of impersonal rules
are an essential ingredient in any smoothly functioning organization, especially if the
organization is large. The enabling functions of organizational rules were emphasized probably
most prominently by the classical sociologist Weber (1978, reprinted).
Following the Weberian tradition, Ocasio (1999), among others, identified positive functions of
rules and routines in organizations that apply equally well to tenure rules. First, tenure rules for
the shacho provide readily available solutions, scripts, and procedures for the shacho change
process. Tenure rules may provide a shacho with a time horizon, during which he could prepare
for his own exit. Tenure rules may also provide the board of directors with a timetable so that
they may start the search process for the next shacho in a timely manner. The rules may also
synchronize organizational activities in a way that minimizes the disruption caused by the
change at the top. Second, tenure rules for the shacho provide accountability and reliability in
the shacho change process. Tenure rules help reduce the risk of a shacho serving too long with
harmful consequences for the firm. Finally, tenure rules help enable board actions and decisions
by limiting and channeling political conflicts in organizations. The political competition may be
limited to a period around the expected date of shacho change, freeing the organizational
resources and the shacho's attention for more productive purposes.
Three types of tenure rules for shacho
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Tenure rules for the shacho may regulate the length of the unit term, the maximum number of
years allowed, or the maximum age allowed for the office. For each of these, I explore the main
characteristics, its function in regulating the timing of executive exit, and its potentially
dysfunctional aspects.
The first type of tenure rules concerns the length of the unit term. The rule is usually made
explicit and firmly observed for political offices. The unit term for U.S. presidency is 4 years, 7
years in France, and 5 years in Korea, for instance. In the corporate scene, the contract length for
CEO is comparable to the unit term in political systems. The contract term for CEOs and other
members of the board is usually standardized within a national boundary. As for Japanese
shacho, two years is the universally accepted unit term. For example, a shacho's tenure is often
expressed using the notion of 'ki' (term), as in two-term-four-year or three-term-six-year.
The existence of a unit term provides stability in the leadership for the specified duration. It
provides a time horizon during which the shacho is expected to deliver results. It results in
entrainment, or synchronization, of the monitoring process by various stakeholders, which
renders efficiency to such efforts. Yet the unit term may prove dysfunctional if the duration of
the unit term does not match the rate of change in the environment. An appropriate duration of
the unit term may be hard to set to begin with. Even when a firm has found the right duration
at one point in time, subsequent changes in business environment may make the duration
unsuitable in the future.
The second type concerns the tenure limit that is, the maximum number of years in the top
position. The tenure limit rule may vary across firms and institutions. Again, a useful analogy is
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found in the political arena, in presidential offices in the U.S., France, and Korea for example.
American Presidents serve a maximum of eight years in two terms of four years each. The
presidency in France does not have any tenure limit, at least under the current constitution. For
instance, President Miterrand served 18 years before he died in office. Korean presidents are
subject to the most severe tenure limit of just five years, as they are required by the constitution
to step down after one term.
The tenure limit rule limits the power of the incumbent, which may increase with the tenure of
the leader. It is interesting to note that Korea adopted the most restrictive presidential tenure
limit rule after the experience with the late President Park Chung Hee, whose autocratic rule
continued for 18 years until his reign came to an abrupt end with his assassination in 1979. A
dysfunctional aspect of tenure limit rule, especially if it is strictly followed, is that the
incumbent may become a lame duck as he reaches the final years in office. Anticipating the shift
of power at the top, organizational participants may refuse to cooperate with the incumbent,
waiting for the new leader to emerge.
For Japanese shacho, a few firms have a widely known tenure limit rule. For example, a shacho
with Hitachi Corporation serves for ten years, while Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Japan
Steel have shacho who serve for four years. These rules are referred to as 'hubunritsu (an
unwritten rule),' and are widely known within the organization as well as among business
journalists. The rules have been followed without an exception for more than 30 years in the
case of Hitachi, and for more than 20 years in the case of latter two firms.
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Finally, establishing a retirement age, formal or informal, is another form of tenure rule. As a
shacho may be reluctant to give up the position, which is often the last step in his life-long
career, and usually have the power to lengthen his reign, establishing a retirement age can serve
as the last safeguard that ensures a smooth, timely transition.
In addition to limiting the power of the shacho, the retirement age rule may be useful in
motivating aspiring young executives. It will be particularly useful in firms that rely heavily on
the internal labor market for the next crop of top managers. An established retirement age for
the incumbent may assure them that they will have a shot at the top corporate position. The
retirement age rule may have a similar dysfunctional aspect as the tenure limit rule: a shacho
may become a lame duck towards the end of his tenure. The other dysfunctional potential of the
mandatory retirement age rule is that age is often not a precise measure of ability. By setting the
mandatory retirement age, firms may forego the service of old but wise leaders.
Japanese firms do not usually have written rules for the shacho mandating a compulsory exit
before a certain age. Yet, Itami (1995) documents that the standard deviation is very small
around the mean retirement age of 68. In my sample, analyzed below, more than 80% of shacho
retire before age 70. This suggests that the Japanese shacho is often expected not to serve beyond
a certain age, even though written rules to that effect may not exist.
it is important to bear in mind thaL these rules, if they are established, usually allow a
considerable degree of flexibility, which makes the rules quite elusive to pin down. It is often
quite hard to verify, on a case-by-case basis, whether a given shacho change event is following
the rules. The shacho and the board under his control sometimes have the-power to bend pr
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rewrite the rules. Changing business environment may sometimes justifiably require certain
rule bending. Sometimes, there may be a conflict between rules. For example, a firm may have
an expected retirement age of 67 and the expected tenure limit of 10 years. If the shacho was
appointed at the age of 60, the board might flexibly decide to let hin serve for 10 years, ignoring
the limit on retirement age.
Figure 1 presents the hazard rates of shacho departure in my sample of the top 200 Japanese
manufacturing firms from 1955 till 1995. The hazard rate for a year is a conditional probability
of departure conditional on that the subject shacho has survived up to the given year. For
instance, the hazard rate for the 8th year is shown to be about 0.2, meaning that of those who
have served for 8 years, about 20% will depart from the top position during the 8th year. Figure
1 illustrates how the unit-term rule and the tenure limit rule may operate in Japan. Hazard rates
are significantly higher for the even-numbered years (4th, 6th, arid 8th years for instance) than for
the odd-numbered years. This confirms the presence of the 2-year unit term, at the end of which
shacho change is more likely than in the middle of the unit term. At the same time, hazard rates
are far from zero in odd-numbered years, suggesting that the unit-term rule is applied flexibly.
By the 10h year the survival rate is only 30 percent, that is, about 70 percent of shacho end their
tenure before year 10. In fact, the surviving 30 percent includes a fairly large nuwber of
founders or their family members. Thus we may conclude from the figure that a tenure limit
rule operates in many Japanese corporations,,limiting the maximum tenure, especially for a
shacho not related to the founding family (puropa shacho).
2. The concept of tenure milestone and hypotheses
112
Predecessor's tenure as a milestone
One of the important themes in the study of organizations is to understand the evolution of
organizational rules. Yet, to my best knowledge, nobody has studied the evolution of CEO
tenure rules either in Japan or in the U.S. Given the elusive and often nebulous nature of tenure
rules, this chapter focuses on the role of precedents to the rule-forming process. Precedents are
important in the development of organizational rules (Selznick, 1957; Zucker, 1977; March &
Olsen, 1989; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Ocasio, 1999) and the
predecessor's tenure may provide an important milestone for successors. Every shacho takes
part in the evolution of tenure rules, in the absence of formalized written rules, by setting
precedents with their own decision on when to step down. The successor must make his own
departure decision under the common knowledge of the precedent(s) shared by all interested
observers.
The concept of tenure milestone suggests an interesting new way to look at the life cycle of a
shacho. The period leading up to the tenure milestone may be called a honeymoon period, as the
precedent tends to protect the incumbent. Then, there is a tenure milestone period, during
which the incumbent may have to decide whether to follow the precedent amid aroused interest
and scrutiny by various stakeholders. If the shacho decides to stay on in the top position, he
enters the third phase. His performance may need to be sufficiently high to satisfy the
potentially hostile stakeholders whose expectation has been once betrayed by the shacho's
refusal to step down during the milestone period.
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The following is an illustrative example. Suppose that the predecessor's (A) tenure was 5 years.
If the successor (B) serves for 10 years, his 10-year tenure may be divided into the following
three sub-periods. The first three years may be called the honeymoon or trial period. During
this period, the new shacho may be exempted from undue pressure to perform, while some new
shacho may be prematurely forced out, failing to establish a minimum level of control. The next
three years may be called the tenure milestone period, when he contemplates on whether to
follow in the predecessor's footsteps or not. I allow one-year buffer before and after the
predecessor's exact tenure, reflecting the 2-year unit term. The final four years are the extended
tenure period, where he is setting a new, longer precedent for his own successor.
(A) -- 1- 2- -----4---5 (Predecessor's tenure)
(B) ....---1-- 2---3---5---5-------6----I-7-
(Honeymoon or (Tenure milestone) (Over-the-milestone)
Before-the-milestone)
Informal tenure limit rules may evolve as a result of repeated confirmations of a precedent. In
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the incumbent may be pressured to step down
during the tenure milestone period. A precedent repeatedly confirmed then carries more weight
in affecting the departure decisions of successors. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate this rule-
forming process. Figure 2(a) shows the hazard rates of shacho who serve under the precedent of
6-year tenure by the predecessor. The hazard rates for the entire sample are also graphed for
comparison. For those'With the 6tb-year milestone, the hazard rate is highest at about 30 percent
during that year. Moreover, if we follow the definition of the extended tenure milestone period,
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allowing a one-year buffer before and after the exact precedent tenure, the hazard rate for the
milestone period, 5th to 7th year, is over 50 percent1. Figure 2(b) considers the case of a shacho
with the precedent of 8 years in tenure. A similar pattern is observed, except that a higher
portion of shacho in this case decide to respect the precedent. In view of these observations, I
present the first empirical hypothesis.
Hi: Shacho succession is more likely during the tenure milestone period.
Performance and the tenure milestone
Several authors have studied the role of corporate performance on shacho change in Japanese
corporations. Kaplan and Minton (1994) is probably the most well-known of these studies, at
least in the U.S. Despite substantial differences in institutional settings, they find that bad
performance is likely to increase the probability of top executive change, to a similar extent in
Japan and in the U.S.2 Miyajima (1996) considers a list of performance measures, each likely to
be deemed essential by different groups of stakeholders, and studies the changes in the role of
various performance measures in different time periods. He also finds in his probit analysis that
bad performance as measured by poor rates of return on assets increases the probability of
shacho change. Similar findings regarding CEO change in the U.S. corporations have been
'There are 146 CEOs who start under the precedent of 6 years. Of 75 who survive until the 5th year, 38
step down from the top position during the following three-year period.
2 Thysampled top 120 manufacturing companies in Japan from 1980 till 1990. In comparison, my sample
includes top 200 manufacturing companies and the sampling period is also longer, from 1955 till 1995.
Kaplan and Minton employ a probit model, whereas this chapter adopts a duration model for a more
satisfactory statistical analysis. More important, their paper does not specifically focus on shacho change,
as they model changes among the top executives with representative rights, consisting of shacho,
chairman of the board (kaicho), and vice presidents (fuku-shacho).
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reported in Kim and Ocasio (1995), Ocasio (1994), Puffer and Weintrop (1991), and Weisbach
(1988).
In view of the three-period division of a shacho's life cycle introduced above, one interesting
question is whether performance affects the probability of shacho change in the same way in
each of three periods, honeymoon, milestone, and over-the-milestone. In particular, shacho
serving beyond the precedent tenure milestone may operate under an increasingly critical and
potentially hostile scrutiny. For them, bad performance may be more likely to lead to shacho
change.
H2: Poor performance during the over-the-milestone period is more likely to lead to shacho
change, compared with the periods before.
If this hypothesis is borne out by an empirical test, we will have identified an important
mechanism that favors the rule-strengthening tendency in the shacho change process. A shacho
may have to consider the risk of being forced out of the top position in disgrace, while an earlier
departure may be camouflaged as a noble, precedent-following act (yutai, honorable exit), even
under the cloud of poor performance.
Once a precedent is set, the successors will have an incentive to respect it. A precedent once
confirmed may carry an even more weight in the subsequent shacho changes. This process of
cumulative confirmations of a precedent then may lead, over time, to the establishment of a
tenure limit rule that carries a considerable degree of authority, even though it may be of an
unwritten nature (fubunritsu).
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During the tenure milestone period, a different logic may prevail. An auspicious and honorable
way to end one's career as shacho is to leave in the midst of respectable corporate performance.
A leader who steps down while goings are good is said, in the popular Japanese business
parlance, to be walking down the "hanamichi", literally the flower way3. The decision then
would be applauded as an honorable decision (yutai, honorable exit). The flip side of the coin is
that if the shacho is unlucky enough to find himself stuck with poor performance during the
tenure milestone period, he may get even more reluctant to step down. He may argue that
strong, experienced leadership is needed to see off the tough challenges faced by the
corporation 4. Newspaper and magazine articles in Japan about shacho changes teem so much
with references to "hanamichi", that the concept seems to be an essential part of Japanese
business culture governing the shacho change processes. The following hypothesis is based on
this observation.
H3: Good performance during the tenure milestone period is more likely to lead to shacho
change.
It is also possible that performance will not have any effect during the tenure milestone. This is
especially so, if tenure milestone is used as a tenure limit rule, in which case the shacho will step
down regardless of the performance during the milestone period.
3 See the discussion of hanamichi in the last chapter.
4 Japan Steel in 1985 provides a case in point. Shacho Takeda at the time decided to stay for another term
despite the two-term-fowrjyear tenure rule at the company. The explanation was that strong leadership
was necessary to overcome the crisis of high yen (Keizaikai, 1991.4.23).
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Organizational and political variables and the development of tenure rules
So far we have focused on the role of a predecessor's tenure and its interactions with
performance. There are other variables, organizational and political, that may affect individual
tenure duration and the evolution of tenure rules. I suggest three such variables -the larger
talent pool for the potential future shacho, merger between firms of comparable stature, and
prior incidents of shacho change during the tenure milestone -that may encourage shacho
change during the tenure milestone period, thereby facilitating the development of tenure rules.
In Japan, the American-style external labor market for top executives is practically non-existent,
even though a limited number of executives may be sent in from the main bank or the parent
company or government ministries. Most shacho are selected among the insiders (haenuki).
Therefore large and prestigious firms may enjoy a more congenial environment for the
development of tenure rules as shacho change is facilitated by the larger talent pool of potential
future shacho. One proxy indicator of a larger talent pool is the ratio of elite university graduates
among the board of directors.
H4: Shacho succession is more likely during the tenure milestone period in firms with higher
ratios of elite university graduates among the board of directors.
Tenure rules limit and channel the political conflicts within the organization. The need for
tenure rules thus may be higher when there is a fierce political conflict within an organization.
Firms that have experienced a recent merger may be a good example. The post-war corporate
history in Japan produced a large batch of such firms with potential subunit rivalry.
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Immediately following the end of the war, many firms were ordered by the Allied Occupation
to dissolve into smaller-sized firms. Beginning from the late sixties, however, there were waves
of friendly mergers that reversed the post-war anti-trust decisions. Japan Steel, discussed in the
appendix to the previous chapter, provides one example. A pattern of taking turns by rival
internal factions, called tasukigake (suspender style succession), developed in merged firms. In
an effort to ensure fair opportunities for promotion, many of the merged firms established
explicit tenure rules that limit the maximum length of tenure for shacho. Two-term-four-year in
New Japan Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is a good example.
H5: Shacho change is more likely during the tenure milestone period in firms that
experienced a merger between firms of comparable statue.
Informal rules are strengthened when they are followed repeatedly. When a shacho confirms
existing tenure rules by following the predecessor's tenure, his successor is more likely to
continue in the tradition.
H6: Shacho succession is more likely during the tenure milestone period when there is a
prior confirmation of the precedent tenure.
2. Data and Methodology
Sample and sources of data
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I selected the top 200 manufacturing companies in terms of sales in 1980. All firms are publicly
traded in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Although the sample is obviously skewed toward large
firms, firm size varies considerably, ranging from 30 billion yen in assets to 3 trillion yen and
from 400 to 70,000 in terms of the number of employees in 1980. Ownership structure is also
diverse in the sample: 50 percent belong to the top six keiretsu groups 5, 15 percent are family-
controlled, and 30 percent have other industrial companies among major shareholders.
The unit of observation is the company-year, covering the years from 1955 to 1995. I dropped 7
firms in the sample for which financial data were missing, leaving 193 firms. The seven firms
are the ones that merged during the 1980s. Compared to the U.S. firms, Japanese firms showed
remarkable stability in identity during the period: none of the Japanese firms in the sample
became bankrupt or went private. Not all companies had data for the entire period. Many
became publicly held after 1960. The final sample included 7,021 company-years of data and 823
shacho change events.
The backbone of the data base consists of shacho change profiles compiled from yukashoken
hokokusho, the Japanese equivalent of the proxy statements in the U.S. Yukashoken hokokusho
provides information on a shacho's career path, such as the date of entry at the firm, functional
background, date of entry into the board of directors, past positions held in the board, as well as
some personal demographic information on educational background and the date of birth.
Figure 4-1 in Chapter 4 gives an example of a shacho change profile for the case of Japan Steel.
5Membership in a keiretsu is often difficult to pin down. See Gerlach (1992) for more details. I define
keiretsu membership based on whether the company has a seat in the keiretsu Presidential Club (shachokai).
The top six keiretsu groups are Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Sanwa, Fuyo, and Daichi-Kangyo.
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Financial data for the companies were obtained from the NEEDS ZAIMU database. The data
base also provided data on the number of employees, location of headquarters, and industry
classification. Data on ownership structure were obtained from various annual issues of the
Keiretsuno Kenkyu. Founding and incorporation dates were obtained from the Nihonno Kaishashi
Soran (1995). Educational backgrounds of board members were taken from Kaisha Shokuinroku
(1975).
Model and Measures
Shacho change data are statistically analyzed following the methodology of continuous-time
event history analysis (Tuma & Hannan, 1984). The methodology is commonly used to analyze
data on "survival time", the length of time before a change-event takes place, such as the life
length of patients, electric light bulbs, duration of unemployment, etc. Economists usually call
the statistical model a duration model. Survival analysis is a preferred term in medical research.
The use of event history analysis of shacho change is preferable to the usual practice of sampling
only for the years of change events, which suffers from sample selection bias and implicitly
assumes equilibrium in the change process. It is also preferable to probit or logit analysis in that
they handle the problem of right censoring in the most natural way, and easily incorporate
time-varying covariates. I use STATA, a general-purpose statistical package, for maximum
likelihood estimation of the models.
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Weibull specification is adopted to model the baseline hazard. Weibull specification is more
flexible than the basic exponential specification as it allows monotonic changes in the baseline
hazard 6. The hazard rate r(t) of shacho change in the t-th year of tenure is specified as follows:
r(tj)= h(t) g(Xj), where h(t)= p* t(p-, the baseline hazard function for Weibull distribution, and
g(X,)= ex#, a nonnegative function of the covariates.
The dependent variable is shacho change events. I treat changes as a result of sudden death or
illness of the incumbent as right-censored at that point.
Tenure milestone is a dummy variable with the value of 1 for the years covering the tenure
milestone period, meaning the three-year period centering on the predecessor's tenure. If the
precedent is a 6-year tenure, the tenure milestone period for the incumbent is the three-year
period from the fifth to the seventh year in his tenure. The three-year buffer to make the concept
of tenure milestone operational reflects the following two considerations: (a) there is a margin
of error as I measure the tenure in terms of years, not months and (b) two years is the length of
the unit term in Japan. Over-the-milestone is another dummy to designate the last phase of the
incumbent's tenure after the milestone.
To measure corporate performance, I use the previous year's rate of return on assets (ROA).
Corporate performance may be measured by various means including sales growth and
dividends per share, but the standard measure in the U.S. literature on shacho changes is ROA.
6jI have also tested the hypotheses using the exponential specification which showed similar results.
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The size of internal talent pool for future shacho is proxied by the ratio of elite university
graduates in board, or the ratio of graduates from the top five universities7 among the board
members in 1973. Merger experience is a dummy proxying for subunit rivalry. It takes the
value of 1 if the company experienced a merger between two firms of comparable stature
between 1955 and 1975. Two pre-merger firms were deemed to be of comparable stature if both
the firms had been in the top 200 ranking. Prior confirmation is a dummy taking the value of 1
if the precedent tenure has been endorsed at least once before in the shacho change profile of the
company.
The Appendix 5-1 at the end of the chapter provides brief descriptions and definitions of control
variables. See Table 5-1 for standard descriptive statistics for all the variables.
3. RESULTS
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 present the main estimation results. Specifications reported in Table 5-2 focus
on some of the key explanatory variables identified in Section 2, such as ROA, indicator
variables for the tenure milestone period and the over-the-milestone period, and interaction
variables of the period indicators and ROA. The results reported in Table 5-2 may be used for
first-pass tests of the hypotheses 1 to 3. Results reported in Table 5-3 refine those in Table 5-2 by
employing a more extensive list of explanatory variables. The results in Table 5-3 confirm the
test results for the first three hypotheses as reported in Table 5-2, and in addition, provide test
results for the remaining hypotheses 4 to 6. As coefficient estimates in event history analysis are
' Business journals generally consider the following universities as the top five: Tokyo University, Kyoto
University, I-itotsubashi University, Keio University, and Waseda University.
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rather hard to interpret in the raw form, I also present Table 5-4 to summarize the results found
in Table 5-3 for more expedient interpretations.
Table 5-2 presents estimation results for six specifications. Model 1, the simplest one, offers the
benchmark for comparison for the more sophisticated models 2 to 6, and includes just the main
effect of performance, apart from the control variables to be employed throughout the models
in both Table 5-2 and 5-3. The negative coefficient estimate for ROA, while statistically
insignificant, suggests that the worse the performance, the higher the conditional probability of
shacho change will be. The subsequent models all report negative coefficient estimates for ROA,
and the results are consistent with the earlier findings in Miyajima's (1996) and Kaplan's (1994)
studies of top executive change in Japan.
Models 2 to 6 present alternative specifications modeling the effects of the tenure milestone and
their interaction effects with performance. The chi-square contrasts of models 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
with the benchmark model 1 are 6.72, 15.29, 21.94, 22.14 and 24.78, respectively, and are all
statistically significant at the level of 0.001. This suggests that the tenure milestone set by the
predecessor's tenure is a significant factor in the shacho change process. The specification in
model 2 adds just one more variable, the dummy for the tenure milestone period, so that the
coefficient for the dummy represents the increase in the hazard during the tenure milestone
period compared to the periods before and after (honeymoon period and over-the-milestone
period, respectively). Model 3 adds one more variable to model 2, the dummy for the over-the-
milestone period. The coefficients for the tenure milestone dummy and the over-the-milestone
dummy in model 3 thus measure the increases in the hazard compared to the honeymoon
period, the first phase of the incumbent's tenure cycle. Model 4 to 6, in addition to the two
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dummies in model 3, also has interaction effects with performance. Model 4 tests the interaction
effect between tenure milestone period and performance, while Model 5 tests the interaction
effect between over-the-milestone period and performance. Model 6 includes the interaction
effects together.
The estimates in model 2 support the hypothesis H1 that the hazard is higher during the tenure
milestone period, reflecting the binding influence of a precedent. During the tenure milestone
period set by the predecessor's tenure, the hazard is higher for shacho change, compared to the
honeymoon and the over-the-milestone periods. In models 3, 4, 5 and 6, the coefficient estimates
for the milestone-period dummy stay positive, but turn insignificant. The results suggest that
shacho who have decided to stay on past the milestone are in there for the long haul, and the
hazard for them is accordingly smaller, as indicated by the strong negative coefficient estimate
for the over-milestone dummy.
The hypothesis H2 states that the negative relationship between performance and the hazard -
the worse the performance is, the more likely the shacho is to leave - is strengthened once the
shacho is past the tenure milestone period. The results for model 5 strongly support this
hypothesis. In order to measure the effect of performance on the hazard during the over-the-
milestone period, the main effect of-performance and the interaction effect between over-the-
milestone and performance must be added. The combined effect has a coefficient estimate of -
6.33 and is significant at the level of 0.01.
The findings do not support the hypothesis H3 that performance has a positive effect for shacho
change during the tenure milestone period. The combined effect of performance for the tenure
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milestone period is almost zero. The zero performance effect, however, reveals the nature of
change during the tenure milestone period. If a shacho is operating under the norm of stepping
down during the tenure milestone period, he will do it regardless of performance during the
period. Although the results do not support the hanamichi effect as hypothesized, the zero-
performance-effect during the milestone period suggests that tenure milestone operates as an
informal tenure limit for the incumbent shacho.
Table 5-3 presents results for models that include the political and organizational environmental
variables designed to test the hypotheses H4 to H6 in addition to the variables considered in
models in Table 5-2. The coefficient estimates for the main variables that were already
considered in Table 5-2 remain almost the same in the new models in Table 5-3. And the results
in Table 5-3 lead to similar test results for the first three hypotheses H1 to H3. Therefore, the
reader may focus on testing the latter three hypotheses H4 to H6 using the results in Table 5-3..
Recall that the hypotheses H4 to H6 concern the effects of organizational environmental
variables on the hazard during the tenure milestone period. To test the hypotheses, we need to
look at the sum of the main effects of these variables and their interaction effects with the tenure
milestone dummy. Raw results as reported in Table 5-3 are not convenient for the purpose, and
thus 1 provide Table 5-4 presenting the sum of the main effects and interaction terms with the
milestone dummy.
Somewhat disappointingly, the test results are rather mixed. In its original form, only
hypothesis H5 is supported, implying that firms with past merger experiences have higher
hazard rates during the tenure milestone period. The hypothesis H4 is weakly supported,
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suggesting that firms with a larger talent pool tend to have higher hazard rates during the
milestone period. However, the empirical results suggest some intriguing reinterpretations of
the role of the tenure milestone as a precedent.
Related to the hypothesis H5, it is interesting to note that hazard rates are higher not only
during the tenure milestone period, but also during the other phases of the shacho's tenure cycle.
This suggests that merger experiences between firms of comparable stature in general may have
the effect of encouraging early departures, shortening the average tenure of shacho. Itami (1995)
documents that the average tenure keeps getting shorter over time in post-war Japan. My
findings suggest that merger-induced shortening of shacho tenures is one of the factors behind
the phenomenon.
The hypothesis H6 is not supported by the tests. Yet, the estimates suggest an interesting
reinterpretation of the role of the tenure milestone. For the over-the-milestone period and also
during the honeymoon period, the effects of prior incidence of confirmed precedent
significantly increase the hazard of shacho change. It seems that prior confirmation tends to
encourage early departure by the incumbent shacho. Thus, prior history of rule following also
seems to contribute to the general shortening of shacho tenures as reported by Itami (1995).
4. Conclusion
This chapter is an empirical study of tenure rules governing shacho change in Japanese business.
Compared with the extensive empirical literature on change and succession of the top executive
officer in the U.S., Japanese counterparts are few in number and limited in their scope. This
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chapter may be considered an exploratory attempt to understand the complicated body of rules
regulating the Japanese shacho change process, only a few aspects of which have been
understood till now.
A key concept for my empirical analysis is the milestone in the shacho's tenure set by the
predecessor's tenure as a precedent. The incumbent shacho's tenure cycle may then be divided
into three periods, honeymoon period, tenure milestone period, and the over-the-milestone
period. Once the shacho decides to stay on in the top position beyond the precedent set by his
predecessor, his performance may be closely scrutinized by increasingly hostile stakeholders
within the organization and without. This unpleasant prospect may give the shacho an
additional incentive to step down in time respecting the precedent. Once confirmed, the
precedent may carry a higher authority in affecting the subsequent shacho's departure decisions.
Shacho change data for the top 200 Japanese manufacturing companies during 1955 and 1995 are
statistically analyzed using the methodology of event history analysis, also known as duration
models in other fields. The empirical results lend a partial support for the hypothesis that the
hazard rate is higher during the tenure milestone period. The hypothesis is strongly supported
that hazard rates have a stronger negative relationship with performance past the tenure
milestone period. A large internal talent pool may increase the hazard rate during the tenure
milestone period, even though the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant. Firms with
recent merger experience also show higher hazard rates during the tenure milestone period,
suggesting that subunit rivalry may facilitate rule-following practices in organizations.
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Organizational theorists have been studying how rules form and develop within an
organization. Rule formation in the area of shacho change/succession has been rarely studied,
however. This chapter represents an important contribution to the literature with its study of
dynamics in the development of tenure rules in shacho change in Japanese business. The finding
that precedents play an important role in the process may be applied in empirical studies of rule
formation in other areas.
The chapter also sheds light on the role of performance in Japanese shacho change. The
relationship between performance and shacho departure is shown to be in the "right" direction
from the corporate governance perspective: Shacho are more likely to depart when performance
is poor, especially when the shacho has stayed in the top position longer than the informal norm
set by the predecessor's tenure.
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Appendix 5-1: List of covariates
Middle of unit term is defined as a dummy variable, which has the value of 1 for the odd-
numbered years in the shacho's tenure. This variable is meant to capture the effects of the 2-year
unit term rule in Japanese shacho change.
Age 67-70 is defined as a dummy variable with the value of 1 when shacho's age falls between
age 67 and 70.
Age 71 and over is defined as a dummy variable with the value of 1 when the age of shacho is
over 71.
Year of CEO appointment is included to control for the historical trends over time. Itami (1995)
reports that shacho tenure has been shortening over the years. Ocasio (1994) also found that
shacho change risk has been changed over the years in the U.S.
Returning CEO is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the shachb has served in the same
position in the same company before. The few cases involve sudden departure by the previous
shacho due to death or illness. The returning shacho are less likely to use predecessor's tenure as
a milestone in his retirement decision.
Firm size is measured by the logarithm of the size of assets in each year.
The number of employees is actually measured as a logarithm of the number of employees.
Firm age is measured as the logarithm of the firm age since incorporation.
Family ownership is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if a member of the founding family
is among the top 10 shareholders.
Family membership is a dummy variable indicating the ties to founding family, with the value
of I if the CEO is a member of the founding family.
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Parent company is also a dummy variable with the value of 1 if another industrial company
owns more than 10% of shares.
Debt-to-assets ratio is used to indicate the degree of main bank control.
Keiretsu membership is noted by 6 dummy variables for each of the six keiretsu groups. The
membership in the Presidential Club of the keiretsu is used to define membership in a keiretsu.
Industry Dummy variables are created for each industry using the 3 digit Japanese SIC code.
The food industry is the omitted category.
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Table 5-1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N=7021)
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. ROA 0.051 0.056
2. End of term 0.472 0.499 -0.000
3. Tenure Milestone (TM) 0.168 0.374 -0.041 0.012
4. Over Tenure Milestone (OTM) 0.187 0.390 -0.004 0.039 -0.216
5. -Age 67- Age7O 0.233 0.423 -0.040 0.030 0.076 0.062
6. Age 71 Over 0.108 0.310 0.041 0.023 -0.030 0.166 -0.191
7. Employee size 8.669 0.941 -0.116 -0.003 0.029 -0.015 0.056 -0.001
8. Ratio of Elite U. Graduates on 0.244 0.149 -0.166 0.003 0.036 -0.019 0.040 0.014
Board
9. Rank in 1965 0.776 0.417 0.059 -0.005 0.012 -0.008 0.002 -0.010
10. Merger before 74 0.052 0.223 -0.106 -0.002 0.065 0.000 0.079 -0.026
11. Prior precedent following 0.137 0.344 -0.033 -0.001 0.120 -0.057 0.053 -0.054
12. Year bf shacho appointment 71.065 14.132 -0.185 -0.032 0.142 -0.243 0.049 -0.230
13. Founder 0.052 0.222 0.140 0.012 -0.102 -0.112 -0.061 0.122
14. Firm size by asset 11.715 1.427 -0.193 -0.005 0.119 -0.081 0.115 -0.058
15. Firm age 4.099 0.515 -0.199 -0.004 0.086 -0.048 0.089 -0.051
16. Returning shacho 0.007 0.085 -0.013 -0.007 0.029 0.036 0.000 0.127
17. Family control 0.182 0.386 0.215 0.007 -0.080 -0.056 -0.098 -0.004
18. Family membership 0.176 0.381 0.181 0.010 -0.071 0.009 -0.127 0.010
19. Parent control 0.290 0.454 0.079 0.002 -0.007 0.021 -0.013 -0.001
20. Debt to asset ratio 0.706 0.144 -0.447 -0.002 0.037 -0.035 0.103 -0.036
Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
7. Employee size'
8. Ratio of Elite U. Graduates on -0.007
Board
9. Rank in 1965 0.035 0.003
10. Merger before 74 . 0.283 -0.069 0.013
11. Prior precedent following 0.072 0.094 0.023 0.079
12. Year of shacho appointment 0.087 0.039 0.012 0.042 0.207
13. Founder -0.203 -0.132 -0.019 -0.029 -0.094 -0.430
14. Firm size by asset 0.569 0.068 -0.009 0.209 0.169 0.697 -0.330
15. Firm age 0.254 0.157 0.106 0.170 0.100 0.358 -0.359 0.452
16. Returning shacho 0.059 -0.011 0.034 0.018 -0.024 -0.049 -0.020 -0.005
17. Family control -0.078 -0.156 0.074 -0.111 -0.144 -0.130 0.275 -0.113
18. Family membership -0.093 -0.115 -0.021 -0.109 -0.130 -0.248 0.303 -0.174
19. Parent control -0.187 -0.029 -0.169 -0.095 -0.008 -0.008 0.078 -0.141
20. Debt to asset ratio -0.026 0.178 -0.076 0.142 0.066' -0.055 -0.048 0.043
Variable 15 16 17 18 19
15. Firm age
16. Returning shacho -0.009
17. Family control -0.016 -0.032
18. Family membership -0.091 -0.018 0.540
19. Parent control -0.257 -0.051 -0.155 -0.119
20. Debt to asset ratio 0.064 0.002 -0.302 -0.232 -0.004
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Table 5-2. Maximum likelihood estimate of shacho change: Tenure milestone effect
Variables Model 1 Model 2
s.e. p
Performance
ROA -1.81 (1.31) -1.92
Timino rules
Tenure milestone period
Owr-the-milestone
Interaction with performance
ROA * Tenure miestone
ROA *Over tenure milestone
Control Variables
Middle of the term
ROA * midterm
Age 67-70
Age over 71
Year of shacho appointment
Founder
Firm size by asset
Firm age
Returning shacho
Number of Employee
Family control
Family member
Company control
Debt to Asset ratio
Model 3
s.e. fl
(1.31) -2.08
Model 4
s.e. p
(1.31) -3.75**
0.22*** (0.08) 0.11 (0.09) 0.12
-0.28*** (0.10) -0.29***
s.e.
(1.46)
(0.09)(0.10)
3.90** (1.52)
-0.43*
3.30**
0.92***
1.22***
0.08***
-0.40
-0.41**
0.16
0.39
0.53***
0.06
-0.73***
0.03
1.53***
(0.09)(1.40)
(0.09)
(0.10)(0.01)
(0.22)
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.36)
(0.08)(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.10)(0.32)
-0.43*
3.27**
0.92***
1.22***
0.08***
-0.41*
-0.40***
0.14
0.40
0.53***
0.07
-0.72***
0.03
1.49***
(0.09)(1.41)
(0.09)
(0.10)(0.01)
(0.23)
(0.08)(0.11)
(0.36)
(0.08)(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.10)(0.32)
-0.44***
3.37**
0.93***
1.24***
0.08***
-0.59*
-0.41***
0.13
0.48
0.53***
0.04
-0.75***
0.03
1.46***
(0.09)
(1.41)
(0.09)
(0.10)(0.01)
(0.23)
(0.08)(0.11)
(0.36)
(0.08)(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.10)(0.32)
-0.36***
1.78
0.93***
1.24***
0.08***
-0.58**
-0.42***
0.13
0.46
0.53***
0.06
0,74***
0.03
1.23***
(0.10)
(1.49)
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.01)
(0.23)
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.36)
(0.08)
(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.10)
(0.33)
Model 5
p s.e.
Model 6
p0 s.e.
-1.24 (1.32) -2.60 (1.61)
0.12 (0.09) 0.01 (0.12)
-0.07 (0.13) -0.14 (0.13)
2.64 (1.67)
-5.09** (2.00) -3.69* (2.21)
-0.41***
2.78**
0.93***
1.24***
0.08***
-0.66**
-0.41
0.11
0.43
0.52***
0.02
-0.74***
0.04
1.29*%**
(0.09)
(1.38)
(0.09)(0.10)
(0.01)
(0.23)
(0.08)(0.11)
(0.36)
(0.08)(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.10)(0.33)
-0.37**
1.87
0.93***
1.24***
0.08***
-0.63**
-0.41***
0.11
0.43
0.53***
0.04
-0.74***
0.03
1.19***
(0.10)
(1.49)
(0.09)
(0.10)(0.01)
(0.22)
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.36)
(0.08)
(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.10)(0.32)
-13.40* (0.80) -13.23*** (0.78) -13.28*** (0.79) -12.92*** (0.80)
0.91*** (.03) 0.91*** (0.03) 0.95*** (0.04) 0.95*** (0.04) -12.96*** (0.80)0.95*** (0.04)
-12.80*** (0.80)
0.94*** (0.04)
Number of change events
D.f.
Log likelihood
Constant
finp
823
33
-560.23
823
34
-556.87
823
35
-552.58
823
36
-549.26
1. *p<.10;**p<.05;***p<.OI
2. Keiretsu dummy variables and industry dummy variables were included in the models, although the coefficients are not
reported in the table. The complete results are available upon request from the author.
823
36
-549.16
823
37
-547.84
P
Table 5-3. Maximum Likelihood Estimate of Shacho Change: Organizational and Political Variables.
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
^AM s.e.
Performance
ROA
TM * ROA
OTM * ROA
-2.60
2.64
-3.60*
s.e. p3
(1.61) -2.68*
(1.67) 2.94*
(2.20) -3.56
Competitive Internal Labor Market
Ratio of Elite U. Graduate
TM* Ratio of8Eie U. Grad.
OTM * Ratio of Elite U. Grad.
0.18
0.60
0.10
Subunit Riar
Merger before 1974
TM * Merger
OTM* *Merger
(1.61) -2.59
(1.69) 2.64
(2.23) -4.07*
s.e. p
(1.*61) -2.86*
(1.68) 2.66
(2.21) -2.87
s.e. p
(1.62)
(1.67)(2.62)
(0.40)
(0.60)
(0.56)
0.64** (0.25)
-0.09 (0.32)
-0.48 (0.36)
Prior Precedent Followino
Prior Precedent Following
TM * Prior Precedent Following
OTM * Prior Precedent Following
0.35** (0.16)
-0.11 (0.22)
0.11 (0.23)
-13.20*** (0.79) -13.25*** (0.80) -12.83*** (0.81) -13.08***
0.95*** (0.04) 0.95*** (0.04) 0.96*** (0.04) 0.96***
LUkelihood Ratio
D.f.
Number of events
*p <.iO; **p<.05; ***p<.01
-547.84
37
823
-546.39
40
823
-542.92
40
823 %r823%i
-541.46
40
823
('0.81) -12.66*** (0.83)
(0.04) 0.97*** (0.04)
-535.10
46
823
-2.96*
3.03*
-3.13
0.21
0.61
0.03
0.63**
-0.03
-0.40
0.33**
-0.13
0.11
s.e.
(1.63)
(1.70)
(2.26)
(0.40)
(0.60)
(0.57)
(0.25)
(0.32)
(0.36)
(0.16)
(0.22)
(0.23)
Constant
/In.p
I
Table 5-4. The effects of organizational and political variables for three periods
Variables Before
Tenure
Milestone
fl
Performance
ROA
Tenure
Milestone
/3
Over
Tenure
Milestone
p
6.9**
Competitive Internal Labor
Market
Ratio of Elite U. Graduate
Subunit Rivalry
Merger before 1974
Prior Precedent Following
History of shacho change during
the TM period
0.21
0.63**
0.33**
1. *p <.10; ** p <.05; ***p <.OI
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0.07
0.82*
0.60**
0.20
0.24
0.23
0.43***
Figure 5-1. Hazard rate of shacho change: all sample
1174 subjects
911 failures
9557 total analysis time at risk
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Figure 5-2(a). Hazard rates of shacho change (6th year as the tenure milestone)
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Figure 2(b). Hazard rates of shacho change (8th year as the tenure milestone)
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Predicted hazard rates as a function of performance
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Figure 5-3.
Chapter 6. Conclusion
(1) Summary: Succession rules for Japanese shacho
The dissertation starts from an observation that it is not an easy or natural thing for leaders to
prepare their own exits. Existing studies on CEO succession in the U.S. have relied on power
theory and examined the various political processes that solve the syndrome of the reluctant
hero. Taking institutional theory, which emphasizes the role of formal and informal rules in
structuring organizational activities, and combining it with political approaches has proved to
be a fruitful approach to the study of CEO succession. The institutional approach to CEO
succession is especially important in understanding the phenomenon in the Japanese context,
because the political processes that govern the CEO succession process and outcome in the U.S.
are not available under the Japanese corporate governance system. Therefore, following the
institutional theory of action (March & Olsen, 1989; March, 1994; Ocasio, 1999), 1 have suggested
the concept of organizational identity and rules as a way to understand the dynamics involved
in CEO succession. That is, both power and institutional logic affect CEO succession by shaping
organizational identities and rules.
The application of the institutional theory of action to the Japanese corporate governance
system shows that both institutional logt and dominant stakeholders are indeed important in
shaping shacho succession process in Japan. Yet, solving the succession conundrum, especially
in the managerial firms where shacho and top managers are given enormous autonomy from
dominant stakeholders, poses a challenge that can only be met by exploring the role of
succession rules in governing Japanese shacho succession.
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The dissertation shows that shacho succession in Japan is guided by various succession rules that
reflect community identity. Both community logic and dominant stakeholders shape
organizational identity and the shacho succession process. The review, however, leads us to the
puzzle of how CEO succession is managed in managerial firms in which dominant stakeholders
do not play a role in shaping CEO succession. I took both qualitative and quantitative
approaches to addressing the problem of the reluctant hero.
By examining shacho succession stories from the popular business press, I identified several
rules of CEO succession in Japan. First, the shacho takes the initiative in the CEO/shacho
succession process. Second, insider succession is prevalent in most firms. The insider usually
came from the top two ranks-vice president or senior executive manager-of the top
management hierarchy. Third, the shacho steps up as a chairman as he retires from the shacho
position. Fourth, many firms relied on rather explicit tenure rules that guide shacho succession.
Often times, organizational actors, especially the shacho, broke the rules. The rule breaking was
evaluated along the two guiding principles: the rhetoric of rejuvenation and the rhetoric of
'flower way.' When the rule breaking confirmed the guiding principles of shacho succession, it
was put in a positive light. However, when the rule breaking went against the guiding
principles, the shacho succession went through intense public scrutiny.
Next, I examined in a quantitative study how the rules and rhetoric identified from the
qualitative study influence the actual shacho succession process and outcome in large Japanese
firms. In particular, I have tested for the role of tenure rules. The difficulty of studying
organizational rules in general is that organizational rules tend to differ across firms. Tenure
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rules are not an exception. Some firms had a 4-year tenure rule, while others had 6-year or even
10-year rules. I overcome this difficulty by suggesting the concept of tenure milestone. The
concept of tenure milestone provides an interesting view on the life span of a shacho. That is, a
shacho's life cycle can be divided into three distinctive periods based on tenure milestone-
before the milestone, milestone, and over-the milestone-presenting different mandates for the
incumbent shacho. It is hypothesized that if the shacho succession is guided by tenure rules, there
should be more shacho succession during the tenure milestone period. As predicted, the shacho
succession was more likely during the shacho succession, regardless of performance.
Interestingly, past the tenure milestone shacho succession was related to poor performance,
suggesting the stricter scrutiny of dominant stakeholders. Moreover, organizational and
political factors, such as the existence of a large internal talent pool and subunit rivalry resulting
from merger, also facilitate shacho change during the tenure milestone period.
(2) Japanese shacho succession in comparative perspective
Now that we know shacho succession in Japan follows a set of succession rules, what does it say
to the CEO succession literature in general? Is it a story that is only pertinent to Japan? Or, is the
story generalizable to other national economies? The quick answer is that it is both a story of
CEO succession in general, and a story of Japan. The comparison of succession rules for CEO in
the U.S. illustrate the point. Consider the CEO succession profile of Avon that Vancil (1987) take
up as an example. What we find from the CEO succession profile of Avon is that rules that I
identified in Japan -such as insider selection, separation of President and Chairman, and
stepping up to Chairmanship-have been the rules of CEO succession in the U.S. as well, at
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least before the 1980s. These rules reflect the community identity, which was the dominant
institutional logic before the shareholder revolution took place in the late 1970s, as several
researchers on corporate governance have pointed out (Blair, 1995; Useem,1996).
The commonalities in the two countries challenge us to think about the underlying conditions
for the development of community identity and the succession rules that match the identity.
What could have been the underlying structural conditions that created the community identity
in the two countries? The fact that some of the common succession rules are found mainly in
managerial firms in Japan rather than in stakeholder-controlled firms suggests that the
separation of ownership and control was a major condition for the development of the
community firm. Community identity is difficult to cultivate when there is a strong stakeholder
who could shape an organizational identity that represents his narrowly defined interests.
At the same time, however, we don't see the development of tenure rules in the U.S. nor do we
frame the CEO succession in terms of rejuvenation or the flower way. I doubt tenure milestones
has played a major role in the CEO succession process and outcome in the U.S., although it
remains an empirical question. In other words, we see succession rules that guide CEO
succession differ in the two countries. The difference may reflect that the Japanese community
firms have been more successful in constructing "community" that is independent from any
one stakeholder. Now, what made the difference between the J-type community firm and A-
type community firm? In the previous chapters, I surmise that the notion of 'ie (household)' that
had developed in the pre-modern Japan may have provided an enduring model for the modern
firm. as providing the model for firm that overcomes the boundary of time and space. However,
I would not like to suggest that the traditional notion and associated symbols will explain
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everything by themselves. I've mentioned that there is an important departure between the
concept of household in pre-modern Japan and the concept of community in modem Japanese
corporations. Rather, I am suggesting that organizational actors have used these shared symbols
to create the J-type community firms that we see in the post WWII Japan. In other words, the
diversity in the succession rules not only reflects the differences in the shared cultural artifacts,
but also the role 'agency' plays in constructing those rules.
Another important question is what was the reason for the change in the U.S? And why don't
we see the change in Japan? Can we attribute the rise of the shareholder revolution to a purely
structural mandate? Can we say that it is simply a matter of time before Japanese firms will
accept the property conception of firm as they are under similar pressure from the ever-
globalizing financial market? I do not intend to deny a role for the structural conditions that are
putting pressure on J-type community firms. Still, I believe that the "agency" of various
stakeholders deserves more attention in the maintenance of a community firm. I start with the
proposition that construction of community identity, or the creation of institution in Selznick's
sense, requires an explicit and implicit commitment by all stakeholders - that all stakeholders
put the community interest before individual interests. If one or more stakeholders take
advantage of the "community," community identity may collapse quite easily. In other words,
community identity may deteriorate if one of the stakeholders abuses the system. Thus, what is
really remarkable is not the shift from the community firm to shareholder firm, but the
maintenance of the community firm and how stakeholders keep their commitment, as has been
the case with the i-type community firms.
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I would like to reconsider the morality and breach of trust among stakeholders in this light. I
wonder whether the shift to the shareholder property conception was also accompanied by both
top executives and employees who put their interests before the interests of the community as a
whole. For example, although it may have been confined to only a few firms, some executives
enjoyed managerial perquisites and exorbitant compensation. On the other hand, the growth
strategy that put the interests of employees as the main priority could also be thought of as an
example of abusing the system.
In contrast, when faced with economic shocks that put J-type community firms under test,
Japanese top executives and labor union have been more willing to make compromises in the
name of preserving the community. For example, we see few instances of drastic downsizing.
The goodwill of top executives, in which both CEO and chairman shared the responsibility by
resigning after the restructuring, may have caused labor unions to make concessions. The
income differential between top management and employees has been quite small in Japan
compared to that in the U.S.
Japanese top management's and employees' success in defending community identity does not
mean that community identity will be continued in the future. It will depend on the agency as
well as morality of top management and employees, given the increasing pressure from the
international financial market. In fact, I would argue that it is not the routinization that is
threatening the Japanese economy, but the loss of the ethos of the 'community' conception of
firm through various actor's opportunistic activities. For example, some CEOs have refused to
step up or down, but are insisting on remaining as CEO. This puts them in a position where
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nobody could control their interests. The other example is the unconscious development of the
firm as being the property of managers, which has been also captured in Itami (1994)'s study.
(3) Conceptual implications.
The dissertation has at least three conceptual implications for the study of CEO succession and
for the study of organizational action in general. First, organizational identity and the rules
attached to the identity provide an alternative way to theorize 'agency' in organizational theory.
The concept of agency in most organizational theories has been closely tied to self-interest and
power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991) and its manifestation was
various ways to 'resist' institutional pressure (Oliver, 1991). The concept of agency in
institutionalized action theory is much broader, in that it is related to the general process of
constructing organizational identity and establishing the rules that match the identity (March,
1994) and to the general process of interpreting and institutionalizing the meaning in
organizational actions (March & Olsen, 1989). It is the agency in the sense of having 'choice'
over the construction of identity and rules, where accepting the institutional logic is as much a
manifestation of agency as resisting the institutional logic, rather than the agency in the sense of
having self-interest that transcends history and its institutional context The role of institutional
contexts is emphasized as shaping self-interests and power (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) rather
than as homogenizing organizational responses.
Even when we accept 'that there are certain dimensions of self-interest and power that are less
historically contingent the institutionalized action theory suggests that there could be another
source of divergence in organizational response which follows from the creative interpretation
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of institutional rules. In my qualitative analyses of rule breaking behavior in Japanese shacho
succession, I showed that some rules are broken -appointment of new shacho from the lower
hierarchical ranks instead of the usual top two ranks within the top management team-not as a
result of self-interest but as a result of being true to the guiding principle of shacho succession -
rejuvenation. In this sense, organizational actions could be conceptualized as having three
distinctive layers: actions characterized by self-interests and incentive, actions characterized by
duty and norm, and actions that embody the 'spirit (or zeitgeist)' of the institutional rules. The
third layer of action, which could be also characterized as 'beyond-the-call-of-duty,' was
illustrated by one of my advisers who, even when ill, continued to provide thesis supervision
for the author, against the common rule of not risking health for work.
It needs to be mentioned that the third layer is not necessarily morally superior over the other
two layers of action. In fact, we have seen occasions in history where fringe groups have
successfully manipulated individual and organizational identity to encourage socially harmful
behaviors that go against the institutional rule of civility. Even the community identity of firm
in Japan could be criticized for inducing karoshi (death-on-duty), an expression of excessive
loyalty to the community conception of firm. It is sufficient to say that identity is a powerful
way to control individual and organizational action.
Second, organizational identity formation, especially the construction of community, could be
interpreted as providing the answer to a central economic problem-the management of
common resource property (Ostrom, 1990). With no particular owner in place, people have free
access to the resources. No individually rational agent cares about the negative externalities that
his use of resources inflicts on the others. Thus everyone ends up overusing or abusing the
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resources to the detriment of everyone's welfare. This is the famous problem of "the tragedy of
the commons" (Hardin & Baden, 1977). Yet in practice, one can quite easily find successful
instances of common resource management (CRM). Ostrom (1990) draws on studies by
economists, political scientists, and anthropologists, and tries to characterize the essential
elements in successful practices and the necessary conditions for them. Examples of common
resources studied include common grazing grounds for cattle, fishing grounds, and water. It
seems that nobody has thought of modem corporations characterized by separation of
ownership and control, such as Japanese firms, as an example of common property resource.
Resources under corporate control are of course different from grazing grounds. However, it
seems to me that one may think of Japanese firms, with no particular owner willing to exercise
monitoring authority, as an example of common resources with some particular characteristics,
such as (a) the corporate hierarchy and (b) the threat of contingency-based intervention by the
creditors. Thus, applying the common resource management perspective could generate an
interesting theoretical insight into the maintenance of the Japanese style community firm in the
future.
Third, the tenure rules and the concept of tenure milestone provide a way to study the temporal
aspects of CEO's tenure -a rather unexplored aspect of executive decision making (Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991). In an attempt to model the temporal features of CEO's tenure, Hambrick and
Fukutomi (1991) argue that "there are discernible phases, or seasons, within an executive's
tenure, and that these seasons give rise to distinct patterns of executive attention, behavior, and
ultimately, organizational performance." Reviewing several behavioral characteristics
throughout the tenure of a CEO, they develop a time-phase theory of CEO tenure where CEOs
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go through five seasons: (a) response to mandate; (b) experimentation, (c) selection of an
enduring theme, (d) convergence, and (e) dysfunction. Despite the perceptive analysis of
behavioral changes across the seasons of a CEO's tenure, their study did not generate empirical
studies because they did not attempt to model the temporal aspect directly. Moreover, the
realization of five seasons may depend on the existence of formal or informal tenurerules, such
as the tenure milestone that we see in Japanese shacho succession. Thinking explicitly in terms of
tenure rules generates additional questions that ask about the appropriateness of the time
horizon for expecting performance results for new CEOs. For example, do firms in the U.S. have
the right time horizon for their CEOs to learn their job as the CEO? Is the performance pressure
ignoring the wisdom of allowing the experimentation during the first three seasons suggested
by Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991)? The concept of tenure milestone and the closer examination
of tenure rules will shed light on these exciting new questions on CEO's behavior. It also
provides an important extension for the theoretical development that looks at the role of time
and temporal aspects of organizational life (Gersick, 1991; Bailyn, 1993; Ancona & Chong, 1996;
Perlow, 1999).
(4) Methodological Implications
The current study on CEO succession rules states that it is necessary to combine qualitative and
quantitative methodology in the study of rules. Rules are basically context specific. It is a result
of interaction among multiple actors. Even when firms have a similar organizational identity,
succession rules differed across national context and even within national boundaries. For
example, tenure rules were developed only in Japan, largely because age was used deliberately
to structure the organizational competition as well as organizational information. Without
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identifying the rules through qualitative research, we cannot understand how rules affect
organizational action. At the same time, however, we also need a large sample quantitative
study because some of the rules identified through qualitative studies may exist only as rhetoric
and because we want to know the process through which some of the rules gain legitimacy
across a population.
The current study illustrates the merit of iterating between quantitative and qualitative
methodologies. That is, the qualitative study was employed after finding some obvious
pattern - routinization of shacho succession - through quantitative study. The findings from the
qualitative analysis of succession stories were than used to generate testable hypotheses for the
quantitative study. The examples are good performance, instead of bad performance,
facilitating shacho succession (the hanamichi hypothesis) and prior merger experience facilitating
the rule following. In fact I did not plan for the qualitative study from the outset. I started
collecting the stories of Japanese shacho succession only as a way to collect data on shacho
succession due to death or ill health that were not available from official documents of firms,
such as the Japanese equivalent of proxy statements and company history books. At the same
time, during my qualitative analysis I often went back to my quantitative data base to see the
trends and to confirm how dominant some rules, such as the rule of insider selection and the
rule of retiring as a chairman, have been acted on in the study period. The data base was
especially useful in distinguishing the stories that were not substantiated in the actual
succession process from the stories that had a broader factual basis.
The current study also shows the merit of taking a comparative perspective in studying
organizational rules. Rules are often taken for granted by both organizational actors and
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academics studying organizational phenomenon. In the current study, I was able to identify
succession rules because I had CEO succession in the U.S. as an explicit reference point, and I
was able to look at Japanese CEO succession as an outsider. There is clearly merit in being an
outsider in the study of CEO succession. For example, both Itami (1995) and Miyajima (1996) are
aware of the role of some of the rules that affect the CEO succession process. Yet, to them, these
rules were something that should be 'controlled' for, rather than something that is worthy of
independent investigation.
Taking a comparative perspective need not be a direct comparison between two national
systems. In fact, one has to be careful when launching a direct comparison of two systems
because it is likely to produce a non-interesting result as one country is compared to the
standard of another country. I am not saying that good comparative study is impossible. Rather,
I am considering the risk of mechanical comparison of different business system. We need to
understand how similar structural elements are 'interpreted' in different business system. We
need to understand how meanings are construed in different economic systems.
The study of Japanese CEO succession was also important in finding the change in CEO
succession rules that accompanied the shift in dominant institutional logic that happened
around the 1980s in the U.S. In fact, now that we know Japanese CEO succession rules, we
could have a new look at CEO succession in the U.S.
In short, while the qualitative approach provides an insider's perspective for the researcher, the
comparative approach provides an outsider's perspective. The study of organizational rules
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shows the merits of the healthy tension between being an insider and being an outsider at the
same time.
(5) Further research agenda.
Several issues remain to be addressed in this dissertation. First, I have not looked at how the
tenure rules emerged in the beginning and how linguistic framing helped them emerge. I have
only shown that the rules exist under various conditions but I have not explored how the actors
actively developed institutional and organizational rules through sharing what they believed to
be a morally superior way of managing the firm. In fact, this is a real problem. Although I stated
explicitly the role of agency in using the institutional rules, I have only revealed the agency of
top management in a few cases where they broke the rules. I have not explored systematically
how agency did play a role in the development of CEO succession rules. I have shown that
agency of top management and labor unions was important in shaping community identity
during the early post World War II period, but I have not explicitly dealt with the emergence of
various rules directly. So the next step will be going to similar qualitative studies to see the role
of various actors in the initial emergence of succession rules, especially tenure rules.
Also, there has been a great change in corporate governance in Japan. Recent changes make the
board of directors look more like the U.S. board of directors. The size of the board of directors
has been significantly reduced. Moreover, the directors have been divided into two groups:
executive directors and regular directors. The purpose of the executive directors is to make the
locus of decisiorn making clearer so that it is known who is responsible if a strategy fails.
However, it is not clear whether regular directors could do their job as a monitoring agent,
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because they are still insiders who actually stay in the lower ranks in the organizational
hierarchy. In any case, the pressure of performance and doubts about the Japanese type
business system are putting pressure on the current form of shacho succession. This has been
expressed by Itami (1995), who regards routinization as something of a negative quality in
Japanese management. Thus, it is important to know how this self-doubt plays out in the shacho
succession process and outcome and how such self-doubt changes the shacho succession rules.
The commons resource management perspective will actually give some light to evaluate
whether these changes will be good for Japanese management in the future.
Also, a very interesting research venue follows naturally from the study of succession rules in
Japan. We have tested hypotheses regarding tenure rules. We could also extend our study to
test quantitatively whether some of the other rules of succession are affecting CEO succession.
Two points are especially worthy of testing-hanamichi and rejuvenation. The hanamichi
hypothesis was tested in Chapter 5, but it did not consider how such logic will play out in the
dynamics between CEO and chairman. The easy prediction will be that the hanamichi
phenomenon will be more likely to be observed in CEO succession cases that involve the
retirement to chairman. Where rejuvenation is concerned, an interesting question is whether a
performance crisis will bring younger executives into top management Thus, we might expect
the age of a new shacho to be younger following a performance crisis. It will be interesting
whether the rhetoric really reflects what happens in the real world, or whether it just remains as
rhetoric.
Another fruitful extension should be to explore the development of CEO succession rules in
Korea. Korea provides a very interesting place to extend the study because Korea is also very
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conscious of age. Age is also very important in structuring organizational life. Korean firms are
different from Japan in many ways, however. First, the concept of household is somewhat
different-the principle of primogeniture has been more important, for instance. Second,
management and control are not yet separated. Third, Korea has been learning from two
models, instead of one, that is the U.S. business model and the Japanese. Thus, it would be
interesting to study how the organizational actors use the different models.
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